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SUPPLEMENTAL SERENDIPITY: CONGRESS’ 
ACCIDENTAL IMPROVEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
JURISDICTION 
James M. Underwood∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
In 1990, largely in response to a dare from the Supreme Court,1 
Congress took its first institutional step2 into the murky waters3 of 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law.  J.D. The Ohio State 
University, 1987; Law clerk to The Honorable Jerry Buchmeyer, U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas, 1987-88; Associate and Partner, Thompson & Knight, Dallas and 
Houston, Texas, 1988-1998; Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P, Dallas, Texas, 
1998-2002.  I wish to thank Professors Roberta Flowers and Michael Allen for their valuable and 
encouraging comments on early drafts of this article and my research assistant, Elena Antropova, 
for her enthusiastic help with this article.  I would also like to acknowledge that this article was 
made possible by virtue of Stetson University’s generous Summer Scholarship Grant. 
 1. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 2. The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction—historically referred to under the twin banners 
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction—has been almost exclusively the province of the federal 
caselaw and not legislation.  See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 1367 and All That: Recodifying 
Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 53, 54 (1998) (“The law governing the federal 
courts’ supplemental jurisdiction, previously described in its various parts as pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction, had long been developed by judicial decision with virtually no direct legislative focus 
on the subject.”).  Professor Rowe noted one limited exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), which 
expressly authorized supplemental jurisdiction over claims for unfair competition under state law 
“when joined with a substantial and related claim” under federal copyright, patent and trademark 
laws.  Id. at 54 n.6.  See also James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The 
Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 117 (1999) (“The Supreme Court had 
developed the two doctrines in a series of decisions running well back into the nineteenth century 
without much in the way of explicit guidance from Congress and without identifying an entirely 
satisfying conceptual or statutory basis for them.”). 
 3. Rowe, supra note 2, at 55 (“[S]ome Supreme Court decisions were questionable in their 
reasoning and effects, and the field suffered from lack of clarity in as yet unilluminated corners.”); 
See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (“[O]ur cases do not display an entirely 
consistent approach with respect to the necessity that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred.”); Id. at 
575 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I fear that [the majority’s approach to supplemental jurisdiction] will 
1
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supplemental jurisdiction by enacting a statute that provided, generally, 
for federal court jurisdiction over all related claims that are part of the 
same case or controversy as claims in the action within the court’s 
original jurisdiction.4  This federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 13675 (Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute), has been nearly 
 
confuse more than it clarifies.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523 (2d ed. 1984, 1998 Supp.) (“[I]t . . . is 
difficult to discern any single rationalizing principle that will explain [the] diverse rules.”); Pfander, 
supra note 2, at 116-17 (with reference to its origin and development in and through caselaw, noting 
that “[a]s a consequence, the judicial doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction showed some of the 
messy signs of case-by-case elaboration, with curious stops and starts along the way.”). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. 
Mengler, Congress Accepts Supreme Court’s Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 
JUDICATURE 213, 215 (1991) (“Section 1367(a), for example, generally authorizes the district courts 
to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim whenever it forms part of the same constitutional 
case or controversy as the claim that provides the basis of the district court’s original jurisdiction.”).  
Professor Mengler was one of the primary drafters of § 1367.  See infra notes 93-96, 110, and 
accompanying text. 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides, in relevant part: 
(a)  Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by 
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution.  Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that 
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(b)  In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded 
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made 
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over 
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, 
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 
I have not recited the remaining provisions of § 1367 because their inclusion was not necessary to 
the discussion in this article.  However, it is worth noting that subsection (c) permits the courts to 
exercise their discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  One interesting, and open, 
issue under subpart (c) is whether the enumerated factors are different from those recognized by the 
pre-§1367 caselaw.  Compare Brazinski v. Amoco Petrol. Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that § 1367(c) codifies Gibbs factors) with Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. 
U.S. Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding, in effect, that subpart (c) provides 
narrower grounds for discretionary refusal of supplemental jurisdiction than contemplated by 
Gibbs).  See also La Sorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F. Supp. 1413, 1415 (D. 
Colo. 1993) (holding, in effect, that subpart (c) provides narrower grounds for discretionary refusal 
of supplemental jurisdiction than contemplated by Gibbs).  Subpart (d) provides for a tolling of the 
applicable statute of limitations until 30 days after a claim covered by (a) is dismissed, unless state 
law provides for a longer tolling period.  The Supreme Court held recently that subsection (d) was 
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper clause of Article I, against challenges that it could not 
be applied in the face of inconsistent state law on tolling.  See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 
2
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universally derided by legal scholars6 and numerous judges7 since its 
enactment thirteen years ago, including by its own scholarly drafters.8  
As will be discussed in this article, much of the criticism of the statute 
seems to be borne of the fact that it has effected substantially more than 
a mere codification of prior case law.9  Accordingly, Congress 
effectively displaced federal judges as the sole craftsmen in shaping the 
contours of supplemental jurisdiction.10 
At the core of the debate about the Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Statute lies a deep circuit split over whether federal courts should 
enforce the statute according to its terms or resort to its legislative 
history to enforce instead what Congress surely must have meant.  At 
stake are not only questions as to the continued viability of such 
jurisdictional juggernauts as Zahn v. International Paper11 and Clark v. 
Paul Gray, Inc.12 but even the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss.13  Further, this debate highlights the tensions between Justice 
 
456 (2003). 
 6. See generally, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government 
Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn’t Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991) [hereinafter 
Arthur & Freer, Government Work]; Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt 
Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991) 
[hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws] Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and 
Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 
445 (1991) [hereinafter Freer, Compounding]; Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute—A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 (1992); 
Colloquium, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important but Controversial Supplement to 
Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31 (1992); Colloquium, The New Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Statute—Flawed but Fixable, 41 EMORY L.J. 69 (1992); But cf. Ellen S. Mouchawar, Note, The 
Congressional Resurrection of Supplemental Jurisdiction in the Post-Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 
1611, 1613 (1991) (noting that the statute “makes great strides in resolving much of the confusion” 
regarding the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine). 
 7. See generally infra Section IV. 
 8. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 2, at 56 (“At least until congress can be persuaded to revisit 
the statute, any error in drafting is chiseled in stone.”).  Professor Rowe was one of the principal 
drafters of § 1367, and in the foregoing article he proposed revisions to the statute to clear up 
ambiguities and to change results otherwise dictated by the current language of the statute.  See 
infra notes 93-96, 110, and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Section III. 
 10. One of the statute’s drafters, Professor Rowe, hints at this anti-legislative bias in an article 
proposing a rewriting of § 1367.  See Rowe, supra note 2, at 56 (“Experience with the codification 
effort when it took place in 1990 had left me, even before controversy about the statute mounted in 
the following year, with doubts about whether the area was better treated by legislation or by 
decisional law.”).  See also Pfander, supra note 2, at 160 (lamenting the fact that “the rigorous 
textualism of Finley and Abbott Laboratories will ultimately displace the judicial role” in shaping 
concepts of supplemental jurisdiction.). 
 11. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
 12. 306 U.S. 583 (1939). 
 13. 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
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Scalia and the textualist camp, on the one hand, and others advocating 
for a more prominent use of legislative history in statutory exegesis.  
Even the United States Supreme Court found itself unable to resolve the 
debate over the statute’s interpretation after deadlocking four-to-four, 
with Justice O’Connor recusing.  Thus, the conflagration has continued 
to burn with tempers sometimes boiling over on both sides.  The 
continuing inability of the circuit courts to get on the same 
interpretational page increases the likelihood of the Supreme Court 
revisiting this issue again in the near future.14 
Regardless of Congress’ possible intentions to the contrary, a “plain 
reading”15 of the statute dictates several significant, though not 
necessarily catastrophic, changes to the doctrine of supplemental 
jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, many federal judges appear dismayed to see 
any perceived legislative undermining of the substantial judge-created 
limitations on federal court jurisdiction erected over many decades of 
federal court jurisprudence.  Legal scholars also have sung a similar 
chorus, possibly miffed at the idea that Congress, perhaps by accident, 
might have achieved some actual advance in the field of federal court 
jurisprudence.  Even the slight majority of federal circuit courts that 
have committed to enforcing the “plain meaning” of the Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute often do so begrudgingly and more out of a sense of 
jurisprudential duty than desire.16  In short, if published cases and law 
review articles are any indication, this statute’s friends and admirers 
could enjoy a cocktail party on the balcony of a mid-sized Manhattan 
balcony.17 
 
 14. James Pfander, The Simmering Debate Over Supplemental Jurisdiction, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1209, 1210 (2002) (“The recent decisions . . . deepen a circuit split on the question of how best 
to read the language of § 1367 and increase the likelihood of a second trip to the Supreme Court.”).  
In a blistering dissent from the Elevnth Circuit’s recent denial of rehearing en banc on the issue of 
how to interpret § 1367, Judge Tjoflat pleaded with the Supreme Court to relsolve the debate of this 
statute: 
Regardless of the underlying merits of the dispute, however, this issue is one where 
careful judicial consideration should not end with a three-judge panel, or even an en banc 
sitting of a circuit court of appeals, but with the Supreme Court of the United States.  In 
light of its own criteria for granting certiorari, the Court should issue an authoritative 
determination as to the proper interpretation of § 1367. 
Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 741 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 15. See infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text.   
 16. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he wisdom of the 
statute is not our affair . . . .”).  Even some courts that defend the need to apply the statute as written 
admit that “[w]hether § 1367(b) is a model drafting exercise may be doubted.”  Stromberg Metal 
Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 17. Although I have seen no empirical evidence, as a lawyer in practice I have seen much 
anecdotal evidence that many practicing trial lawyers appreciate the codification of supplemental 
4
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Whatever the motivation, critics of the Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Statute have called for its legislative demise18 or overhaul—including 
one of its original drafters.19 Short of achieving this goal, courts and 
scholars have suggested other mechanisms for defeating the statute’s 
advances in jurisdiction suggested by the statute’s plain language.  These 
devices consist of such things as declaring the statute vague—even in 
instances when clearly it is not—to justify an interpretation of the statute 
based upon its murky legislative history rather than its language, or 
declaring the result of a straightforward application of the statute to lead 
to absurd results—similarly justifying the trumping of the language with 
its legislative history.20  One scholar has even come up with the novel 
suggestion of suspending the well established and generally applied 
rules of statutory interpretation and adopting a different set of rules— 
“sympathetic textualism”21—to permit a more satisfying interpretation of 
the much-maligned statute.22 
These criticisms of the statute, and the various proposals of novel 
tools for altering the result the statute’s application would otherwise 
require, are indeed ironic.  After all, the impetus for Congress’ first 
significant foray into consciously23 legislating in the area of 
supplemental jurisdiction came at the behest of federal court scholars 
upset with the Supreme Court’s controversial, jurisdiction-limiting 
decision in Finley v. United States.24  In that decision, the Supreme 
Court invited Congress to overrule the Court’s decision through 
legislation if Congress did not agree with the result.25  After Congress 
acceded to this request and passed § 1367, legal scholars and many 
federal judges became upset at the notion that the statute should be given 
 
jurisdiction in § 1367.  I have personally utilized § 1367 to help escape more than one forum where 
neither my client nor I perceived that we had any chance of obtaining a fair hearing on class 
certification.  I share this not only as an admission of possible bias but also to highlight the absence 
in the published literature of any indication that practitioners are up in arms over § 1367. 
 18. Two of the primary critics of § 1367 early on called for Congress to “immediately repeal 
section 1367 or adopt a simple amendment which restores” the prior state of the caselaw.  Arthur & 
Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 6, at 989. 
 19. See Rowe, supra note 2. 
 20. See generally infra Section IV. 
 21. See Pfander, supra note 2. 
 22. Id. at 160-61 (Admitting that the result-oriented goal of his interpretational approach was 
to avoid the “unsetting and confusing” decisions required by the textual approach to interpreting the 
statute). 
 23. Prior to Finley, federal courts had been willing to assume congressional intent to permit 
supplemental jurisdiction when interpreting various jurisdictional statutes that did not expressly 
address supplemental jurisdiction.  Id. 
 24. 490 U.S 545 (1989). 
 25. Id. at 556. 
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any authoritative reading and, in effect, tie the hands of federal judges’ 
efforts to further evolve the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. 
In this article, I contend that the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute 
should be given a plain-language interpretation because the reasons 
underlying the traditional rules of statutory interpretation are sound, this 
interpretation actually achieves the desirable goal of enhancing the 
consistency of federal court jurisprudence26 in this field, and because 
such a reading can be done without causing institutional harm and 
disrupting the business of the federal courts. In short, the Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute is neither broke nor in need of major overhaul or 
abandonment. 
B. Adding Context to the Debate 
It is appropriate to preface a discussion of the Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute with an example of a litigation context typical of that 
in which the statute’s interpretation has arisen.27  Outside litigation 
counsel for XYZ Corporation receives a late Friday afternoon fax from 
the client enclosing an original petition filed against XYZ in 
Brownsville, Texas, state district court.  Ostensibly this appears to 
counsel to be a fairly manageable lawsuit involving a claim that XYZ 
committed a deceptive trade practice through alleged misleading 
advertisements of XYZ’s product to consumers.  The named plaintiffs 
ask for their money back from the transactions, punitive damages, and 
statutory attorney’s fees available under Texas law.  One plaintiff seeks 
damages in the total sum of $100,000 while the other plaintiff’s total 
damages sought is only $50,000. 
What brings counsel to her feet, however, is when she reads that the 
plaintiffs not only sue in their own behalf but also on behalf of a putative 
class of similarly situated consumers of XYZ’s product across the 
nation.  Anyone remotely familiar with litigation in this jurisdiction 
should be aware of the perception among practicing trial lawyers that 
Brownsville is an unlikely place to avoid class certification—either in 
the trial court or on appeal to the intermediate court of appeals in Corpus 
 
 26. As is discussed infra notes 311-17 and accompanying text, another possible good 
achieved through honoring Congress’ intent as manifested in its official legislative pronouncements 
is to expand federal court jurisdiction over a class of cases for which federal courts are, from a 
policy perspective, more appropriate forums. 
 27. Indeed, this hypothetical combines the contexts of the first two significant appellate 
decisions construing the supplemental jurisdiction statute.  See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d 524 
(5th Cir. 1995), aff’d sub. nom. Free v. Abbot Labs, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (Rule 23 class action); 
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (Rule 20 joinder). 
6
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Christi—and also a poor place to have any shot at obtaining summary 
judgment for a defendant in a class action.  Such a perception is not 
limited to just Brownsville, Texas, either.  Indeed, most plaintiff class 
action attorneys “want to avoid federal court like the plague”28 because 
“[f]ederal judges are widely viewed as being less lenient toward class 
actions than their colleagues in the state courts, particularly on the key 
issue of whether or not to certify a class so the case may proceed.”29  
Rightly or wrongly deserved, since the vast majority of civil cases are 
settled rather than litigated to their final end, perception is as important 
to counsel and clients as reality.  Thus, counsel advises XYZ that its 
only chance to avoid a significant settlement obligation, perhaps another 
coupon-type class action settlement where the class receives little and 
the plaintiff’s counsel receives much,30 is to get the case removed to 
federal court. 
Under settled federal jurisprudence,31 complete diversity exists in 
this hypothetical case because the named class representatives are 
citizens of Texas and the defendant is not.32  Since Ben-Hur,33 the 
citizenship of unnamed class members is irrelevant to determining 
whether Strawbridge’s34 complete-diversity requirement is satisfied. The 
only obstacle to removal, therefore, is satisfying the $75,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and this obstacle is 
present in two respects.  First, one plaintiff’s claim meets this threshold 
while the other plaintiff’s claim does not.  Since at least 1939, the law 
 
 28. Martha Neil, New Route for Class Actions: Proposals Raise Questions About Whether 
Giving Federal Courts More Power Over Cases Will Cure the System’s Ills, 89 A.B.A. J. 48 (2003) 
(quoting Kenneth B. Moll). 
 29. Id. 
 30. This phenomenon is not just assailed by corporate defendants but is widely criticized by 
consumer rights’ advocates as well, who object to the class members receiving little or no benefit 
from many if not most class actions.  See id.  In Neil’s article, she quotes one plaintiff class action 
attorney as referring to this process as “just another milking of the system by professionals, in this 
case lawyers.”  Id.  This phenomenon is more than just academic conjecture or the hyperbolic 
ranting of reformers.  During my career in private practice, I was involved in negotiating these kinds 
of class action settlements on behalf of clients who felt the squeeze of unfavorable state-court 
forums. 
 31. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
 32. The hypothetical case is as follows: 
Plaintiff #1 (Tex.) (≥ $75,000), and 
Plaintiff #2 (Tex.) (≤ $75,000), and 
Absent Class (50 states) (≤ $75,000) 
v. 
Defendant (N.Y.) 
 33. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
 34. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
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has been established that each plaintiff must, independently, meet the 
amount in controversy requirement of Section 1332.35  Second, the 
amount in controversy hurdle is also problematic for the remainder of 
the absent class members as it appears that most of them would possess 
claims valued at significantly less than the named plaintiffs.  Since 
1973,36 the result would be that the case is nonremovable because 
original jurisdiction would not lie for the entire case.37 
However, according to the slim majority of federal circuit courts of 
appeal to have opined on the subject, Congress’ “codification”38 of the 
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction in 1990 has, to the surprise of the 
statute’s drafters,39 apparently changed this result.40  In essence, these 
circuits have held that because diversity jurisdiction exists on the 
“anchor claim”—that is, the claim by at least one of the named class 
representatives against XYZ Corporation—the statute’s clear and 
unambiguous language permits the federal court to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims since they clearly 
form one constitutional case or controversy.41 
Thus, as long as this case is filed in states such as Texas (Fifth 
Circuit),42 Illinois (Seventh Circuit),43 Virginia (Fourth Circuit),44 
California (Ninth Circuit),45 or Florida (Eleventh Circuit);46 counsel for 
XYZ will be able to successfully remove this hypothetical case to 
federal court.  On the other hand, if this case is filed instead in an 
unfavorable venue within states such as Colorado (Tenth Circuit),47 New 
Jersey (Third Circuit),48 or Missouri (Eighth Circuit);49 counsel would be 
advised to commence settlement negotiations immediately, as any 
efforts to remove to federal court will be quickly rebuffed.  In states such 
 
 35. See Clark v. Paul Gray, 306 U.S. 583 (1939). 
 36. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
 37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (stating that original jurisdiction is required in order to remove a 
case to a district court of the United States). 
 38. Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 214. 
 39. Id. at 216. 
 40. See infra Section IV. 
 41. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). 
 42. See In re Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995); 28 USC § 41 (2000) (identifying the 
geographic boundaries of each circuit). 
 43. See Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 44. See Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 45. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 46. See Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc 
denied by 362 F.3d 739 (2004). 
 47. See Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631(10th Cir. 1998). 
 48. See Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 49. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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as, for example, Maine50 and New York,51 it is entirely unsettled how 
severe XYZ’s predicament would be, as the circuit courts governing 
those states, while acknowledging the debate, have yet to commit to how 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute should be interpreted. 
C. Overview 
This article will discuss the historical, jurisprudential context of 
Congress’ enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute; provide an 
overview of the rather emotional reaction to this statute from courts and 
legal scholars and of the jurisprudential problems with this reaction; and 
offer a canon for interpretation of the statute that is arguably consistent 
with well settled models of statutory construction.  This proposed 
interpretation dispels much disharmony previously found in federal 
courts’ jurisdictional decisions without causing any fatal damage to the 
business of our federal courts. 
II. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION: THE STATUTE’S BACKGROUND 
The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute was drafted in the glow of 
over one-hundred-and-sixty years52 of Supreme Court decrees 
concerning the twin doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. 
Beginning with Osborn v. Bank of the United States,53 the Supreme 
Court recognized that not every issue in a case needed to turn on federal 
law for there to exist federal court jurisdiction over that case.  Rather, 
federal court jurisdiction might exist over entire causes of action that 
contained some federal “ingredient.”54  Understanding the nuances 
 
 50. See Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (acknowledging the issue but 
refraining from ruling upon it). 
 51. See Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing the 
open issue).  Similarly, there are no reported decisions from either the Sixth Circuit or D.C. Circuit 
discussing this issue.  See, e.g., Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 203 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (noting 
the absence of any controlling law on point from the Sixth Circuit). 
 52. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (observing the federal and state-
law components of that breach of contract action); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. 450, 460 (1860) 
(recognizing jurisdiction over certain claims that were considered “ancillary” to the main action); 
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1909) (reasoning that a state-law claim 
which was related to federal due process claim was within the federal court’s jurisdictional power).  
For a good discussion of the evolution of the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, see 
McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 870-72, and CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
103-06 (5th ed., West 1994). 
 53. 22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
 54. “[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the 
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the 
Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in 
9
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between the two doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction has 
vexed first-year law students, and many lawyers and judges, since the 
formation of the doctrines.  Pendent jurisdiction has traditionally 
referred to a plaintiff’s ability to join related claims to its claims over 
which the federal court already had original jurisdiction.55  Ancillary 
jurisdiction is a related doctrine permitting certain claims to be added by 
other litigants, such as defendants and third-party defendants, to a case 
already pending in federal court.56  Together these doctrines “permit 
parties in many circumstances to litigate an entire controversy, typically 
all transactionally-related claims, as long as the district court has a 
statutory basis for asserting subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim 
raised in plaintiff’s complaint.”57  The twin doctrines are pragmatic in 
theory and application: 
[T]he rules developed to control the exercise of that jurisdiction cannot 
be explained by “any single rationalizing principle.”  C. Wright, 
Federal Courts § 9, p 21 (2d Ed. 1970).  They are instead 
accommodations that take into account the impact of the adjudication 
on parties and third persons, the susceptibility of the dispute or 
disputes in the case to resolution in a single adjudication, and the 
structure of the litigation as governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.58 
At least since Congress’ enactment of § 1367 in 1990, these doctrines 
have come to be referred to under the common standard of 
“supplemental jurisdiction.”59 
Modern concepts of supplemental jurisdiction began with the 
seminal case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs in 1966.60  Gibbs 
represents one of the Supreme Court’s earliest, thoughtful articulations 
of this jurisdictional concept.  Gibbs involved a labor dispute in which 
 
it.”  Id. at 823. 
 55. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE 
STATES, 546 (Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING 
PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS [hereinafter SUBCOMM. REPORTS] (July 1, 1990) (“Pendent 
jurisdiction refers to claims that are joined in the plaintiff’s complaint.”). 
 56. Id. (“Ancillary jurisdiction refers to additional claims that are joined after the complaint is 
filed.”) 
 57. Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 213. 
 58. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 305 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 
RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM, 1075-1081 (David L. Shapiro et al., 2d ed., Foundation Press 1973)). 
 59. As the Federal Courts Study Committee’s Working Papers make clear, this simplification 
in semantics was one of the purposes behind § 1367.  See SUBCOMM. REPORTS, supra note 55. 
 60. 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966). 
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the plaintiff asserted federal and state-law causes of action.61  These 
claims were not required to be brought together in any jurisdictional 
sense; rather, allowing the claims to be joined served concepts of judicial 
efficiency and, thus, fairness to the litigants.62  The Supreme Court held 
that the federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
state law claims that “derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative 
facts” from the federal cause of action.63  As such, both claims formed 
one “constitutional case.”64  Federal courts thus had the presumptive 
constitutional power to hear any such “pendent” claim meeting the 
Gibbs’ transactional test.65 
The Gibbs test, taken to its extreme, would have seemed to permit 
extraordinary and seemingly near-limitless exercises of federal 
jurisdiction over state-law claims.66  However, the Supreme Court 
showed that this doctrine had its limits twelve years later in Aldinger v. 
Howard,67 when the court distinguished between pendent claim and 
pendent party jurisdiction.68  In Aldinger, the plaintiff sought to add to a 
§ 1983 claim against one defendant, a state-law claim against a different 
defendant arising out of the same incident.69  The Supreme Court stated 
that “the addition of a completely new party would run counter to the 
well established principle that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction marked by Congress.”70  Unlike pendent claim jurisdiction, 
as in Gibbs, the Court reasoned that pendent party jurisdiction called for 
“careful attention to the relevant statutory language.”71  In that case, the 
Court looked at 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which authorized federal jurisdiction 
 
 61. Id. at 720. 
 62. Id. at 726. 
 63. Id. at 728. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The jurisdictional power was presumed to have been bestowed by Congress because 
neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts in subsequent decisions made any general effort to 
hunt for a manifestation of congressional intent in any jurisdictional statutes in applying the Gibbs 
standard.  See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (“Despite this principle [that federal courts 
can only exercise jurisdiction conferred by Congress, within the limits of the Constitution] in a line 
of cases by now no less well established we have held, without specific examination of 
jurisdictional statutes, that federal courts have ‘pendent’ claim jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over 
nonfederal claims between parties litigating other matters before the court—to the full extent 
permitted by the Constitution.”) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), Hurn 
v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) and Siler v. Lousiville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909)). 
 66. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) (“Since it is upon Gibbs’ language that the 
lower federal  courts have relied in extending the kind of pendent-party jurisdiction.”). 
 67. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 68. Id. at 17-18. 
 69. Id. at 3-4. 
 70. Id. at 15. 
 71. Id. at 17. 
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over certain civil rights actions, and found in its text congressional intent 
not to permit an exercise of pendent party jurisdiction against an entity 
(a county government) “excluded from liability under § 1983, and 
therefore by reference in the grant of jurisdiction under § 1343(3).”72 
Similarly, in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,73 the 
Court refused to permit a plaintiff to assert state-law claims against a 
third-party, non-diverse defendant.74  The Court stated that the 
defendant’s Rule 14 impleader of the third-party defendant was a proper 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction but that permitting the plaintiff to assert 
its claim against this same party would invite unsavory conduct in 
derogation of the principles behind the complete diversity requirement.75  
Specifically, the Supreme Court was concerned with possible sharp 
practices by shrewd plaintiff’s lawyers undermining established 
jurisdictional boundaries, noting that a plaintiff could otherwise defeat 
the statutory requirements (i.e., the complete diversity rule) by “the 
simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse 
citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.”76  
With regard to congressional intent, the Supreme Court reiterated that 
for a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a given 
context, the court would first have to find that Congress had not 
“expressly or by implication negated” its consent for the federal court to 
hear claims joined with a claim for which the court had original 
jurisdiction.77  There, the Court interpreted § 1332 to not permit pendent 
party jurisdiction over the claims of a plaintiff against a nondiverse 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
 74. Id. at 374. 
 75. Id.  In Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. 267 (1806), the Supreme Court purported to interpret 
the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, to require that all plaintiffs have diverse citizenship from all 
defendants for a federal court to have jurisdiction under that statute.  Id.  This holding has since 
been clarified by the Supreme Court which has made clear that Strawbridge’s complete diversity 
rule was a statutory and not a constitutional requirement.  Thus, in certain contexts courts have held 
that other jurisdictional statutes did not require complete diversity yet were constitutional.  See State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (In interpleader action, Supreme 
Court held that the complete diversity rule was merely an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and not 
Article III).  One recent example of this is 28 U.S.C. § 1369, which went into effect in January 2003 
and provides for federal court jurisdiction over certain mass-tort accidents with only minimal 
diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and defendants.  For each of the last several years, 
Congress has also been debating passage of a so-called Class Action Fairness Act that would 
provide for federal court jurisdiction over certain “large” class actions with only minimal diversity 
of citizenship.  As of this writing, different versions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, has 
been passed by the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives and there is anticipation that the two 
houses will work out a compromise bill suitable to a majority.  See Neil, supra note 28. 
 76. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
 77. Id. at 373 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). 
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third-party defendant even if it met Gibbs’ transactional test.78 
Eleven years later, in Finley v. United States,79 the Court 
demonstrated that it was not done yet with its attempts to evolve a 
workable compromise of the competing aims for efficiency and 
allegiance to prior court-made limitations on federal jurisdiction (e.g., 
the complete-diversity rule).80  More importantly, the Finley court 
pushed Congress back to the forefront with its holding that the Court 
would no longer presume congressional permission for the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction.81  In doing so, the Supreme Court actually 
struck a near death-blow to pendent party jurisdiction and threatened to 
topple the pillars underlying all forms of pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction.  The wrongful-death plaintiff in Finley desired to bring all 
of her claims arising out of the airplane crash death of her husband in 
one forum against all potential tortfeasors.  Because she asserted a claim 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act—for which there was only exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction—against the FAA,82 she had to file her claim in 
federal court.  The issue for the federal district court was whether to 
permit her to join (i.e., pendent party jurisdiction) with that federal 
question a state-law claim against a non-diverse defendant (a utility 
company that was responsible for the power line that the airplane hit 
during its landing) that clearly arose out of the same common nucleus of 
operative facts.  In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that 
pendent party jurisdiction was not present because the Court was duty-
bound to only tolerate such jurisdiction when the underlying 
jurisdictional statutes clearly contemplated such jurisdiction.  In other 
words, the Court was no longer going to continue recognizing extensions 
of court-created jurisdictional concepts without affirmative 
Congressional approval.  Nevertheless, the Court taunted Congress to 
pass legislation overruling the court’s decision if Congress were 
displeased with the restrictive decision in that case: 
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a 
particular statute can of course be changed by Congress.  What is of 
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a 
 
 78. As discussed infra note 71, Kroger has been interpreted to permit only compulsory 
counterclaims by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant who has filed a claim over against the 
plaintiff.  On the other hand, courts have distinguished Kroger to permit a plaintiff to implead under 
Rule 14 a third-party defendant in response to a counterclaim being asserted against the plaintiff.  
See Guaranteed Sys., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855, 857 (M.D.N.C. 1994). 
 79. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
 80. Id. at 555-56. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
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background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of 
the language it adopts.83 
There were multiple problems with the Court’s holding and 
reasoning in Finley, including the following: (i) this plaintiff would be 
forced to pursue piecemeal litigation through no fault of her own; (ii) 
much judicial inefficiency would be bound to follow such a restrictive 
view of pendent party jurisdiction in the federal question context; and 
(iii) judicial observers were left wondering how many other notions of 
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction could withstand this type of statutory 
parsing for congressional approval.84  After all, it was difficult to 
imagine a more sympathetic situation for extension of doctrines of 
judicial efficiency and fairness to litigants than that in which the plaintiff 
in Finley found herself.  If the Court were not inclined to tolerate any 
extension of supplemental jurisdiction to this plaintiff, so the thinking 
went, what litigant could be assured of having their non-federal claim 
heard in federal court regardless of the circumstances?  Even though the 
Court in Finley specifically distinguished pendent claim jurisdiction 
from this requirement of express congressional approval, it seemed to do 
so only because of precedent and without logical support.85  Further, 
Justice Scalia’s dogged refusal to consider any possible assumption of 
extended jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement from Congress 
that it intended to permit such state-law claims to be made in a federal 
forum led to the logical observation that even Gibbs’ pendent-claim 
jurisdiction would not survive such scrutiny, if it were applied.86  After 
all, in the Gibbs opinion recognizing pendent claim jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court never identified any express congressional approval of 
the doctrine.87 
 
 83. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. 
 84. See Pfander, supra note 2, at 120 (noting the common view after Finley that “its emphasis 
on the absence of a statute appeared to threaten many established forms of supplemental jurisdiction 
over additional parties [pendent party jurisdiction]”); Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent 
and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 258 (1990) (expressing concerns that 
ancillary jurisdiction might be threatened in addition to pendent party jurisdiction).  Indeed, some 
viewed Finley as a threat to the very core holding of Gibbs.  McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 887-89. 
 85. The Court seemed to admit that Gibbs did not square with its holding in Finley: 
[O]ur cases do not display an entirely consistent approach with respect to the necessity 
that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred.  The Gibbs line of cases was a departure from 
prior practice, and a departure that we have no intent to limit or impair.  But Aldinger 
indicated that the Gibbs approach would not be extended to the pendent-party field, and 
we decide today to retain that line. 
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. 
 86. Mengler, supra note 84, at 258-60. 
 87. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/2
UNDERWOOD2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:30 AM 
2004] CONGRESS’ ACCIDENTAL IMPROVEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 667 
Such concerns over the sudden, possible demise of important, long-
standing jurisdictional law gave rise to the call for legislation overruling 
the holding in Finley.88  Indeed, some lower federal courts had already 
begun to apply the holding of Finley to deny federal jurisdiction in 
circumstances where jurisdiction had previously been recognized.89  On 
the heels of Finley’s attack on these judicially established jurisdictional 
principles, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended to 
Congress that it “should expressly authorize federal courts to assert 
pendent jurisdiction over parties without an independent federal 
jurisdictional base.”90  This recommendation was premised on the 
Federal Courts Subcommittee’s fear that Finley may have signaled an 
end to the pragmatic doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction: 
“[T]he Court’s rationale [in Finley] may prohibit any exercise of pendent 
party jurisdiction and threatens to eliminate pendent claim and ancillary 
jurisdiction as well.  We recommend that Congress overrule Finley by 
codifying the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.”91  The 
Subcommittee made it clear that it viewed Finley as a threat to both the 
pragmatic tools of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and to litigants’ 
ability and willingness to bring important cases to federal court: 
 
 88. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-734 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 6860 [hereinafter 
HOUSE REPORT].  Virtually every court to opine has agreed that § 1367 was passed in response to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Finley.  See, e.g., Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 113 (4th 
Cir. 2001).  See Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 213 (noting that § 1367 was enacted in response to 
Finley which threatened “to subvert the federal courts’ power to deal with related matters 
efficiently, in single rather than in multiple litigation”). 
 89. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Spartan Mech. Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664, 673-77 
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (no supplemental jurisdiction to support impleader of a non-diverse third-party 
defendant). 
 90. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
47 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMM. REPORT].  The Federal Courts Study Committee was 
formed pursuant to the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).  This act required the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court to 
appoint a fifteen-member committee to spend fifteen months studying the federal courts in order to: 
(i) “examine problems and issues facing the courts of the United States”; (ii) “develop a long-range 
plan for the future of the judiciary”; and (iii) prepare a report on its findings and recommendations 
to the three branches of the federal government.  See Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102(b), 102 Stat. 4642. 
The committee’s report was published on April 2, 1990.  Professor Rowe, who has received much 
attention for his role in drafting § 1367, was one of the Reporters for the committee.  The 
committee’s recommendation for a legislative cure for the problems caused, or at least feared, by 
the Supreme Court’s apparent retrenchment on the pendant and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines was 
but one of many proposed changes.  The committee’s boldest recommendation was for an end to 
diversity jurisdiction with certain exceptions (e.g., mass tort multi-state litigation).  Id. at 14 
(“Diversity cases are a large part of the trial load of the district courts, and their elimination would 
therefore markedly lighten the burden on those courts.”). 
 91. STUDY COMM. REPORT, supra note 90, at 547. 
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By undermining these doctrines the Supreme Court has impeded the 
efficient use of judicial resources and made the federal courts a less 
attractive forum in which to bring federal claims. . . . [I]n our view 
abolishing supplemental jurisdiction would not be a sensible means of 
limiting the federal courts’ work, because the cases eliminated would 
include many that should be heard by a federal tribunal.92 
The House Committee that drafted § 1367 was assisted in its 
drafting efforts by several legal scholars, including Professors Mengler, 
Rowe, and Burbank,93 who initially advised that § 1367 was a 
“codification”94 of the field of supplemental jurisdiction “framed to 
restore and regularize supplemental jurisdiction”95 and hailed as a 
“model of successful dialogue between the judicial and legislative 
branches.”96 
The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute provides for a jurisdictional 
two-step.  Section 1367(a) sets forth a broad, general grant of 
supplemental jurisdiction up to the limits of the Constitution.97  Subpart 
(a) states that “in any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”98  
Further, in case there was any doubt about Congress’ intent to permit 
even pendent party jurisdiction—as the Finley court invalidated—
subpart (a) also adds the following clarification: “Such supplemental 
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention 
of additional parties.”99  With this one simple clarification, Finley’s 
holding that pendent parties have no place in federal court was 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 88, at 6873 n.13.  See also Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 
213 n.aaa (“The authors participated in the drafting of the legislation codifying supplemental 
jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Thomas M. Mengler & Stephen B. 
Burbank, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction?  A Reply to 
Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 944 (1991) (“[W]e did help in framing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in 
the last days of the 101st Congress.”) [hereinafter Rowe et al., Reply].  In the same footnote in the 
House Committee Report, the committee thanked Judge Joseph Weis for helping with the redrafting 
of § 1367 as well as Professors Arthur Wolf and John Egnal for their assistance on the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice in developing § 
1367.  HOUSE REPORT, supra note 88, at 6873 n.13. 
 94. See Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 216. 
 95. Id. at 215. 
 96. Id. at 213. 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2003). 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/2
UNDERWOOD2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:30 AM 
2004] CONGRESS’ ACCIDENTAL IMPROVEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 669 
legislatively overruled.100 
Had Congress intended to permit supplemental jurisdiction, in all 
classes of cases, up to the full limits of the Constitution, it could have 
merely stopped with subsection (a).  In effect, this is what Congress 
achieved with § 1367(a) in federal question cases.101  No more do courts 
have to grapple with the legal fiction of divining congressional intent to 
allow or withhold supplemental jurisdiction based upon the review of 
statutes that truly did not even contemplate that the topic.  Any time a 
statute gets the federal courts out of the business of engaging in fictional 
analysis, that is a jurisprudential improvement. 
The statute, however, takes a decidedly different stance with regard 
to diversity cases.  For diversity cases, Congress chose to impose 
limitations on supplemental jurisdiction—as the federal courts had been 
doing for years.102  Subpart (b) accomplishes this limitation of the 
 
 100. See Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc.,  263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) 
 101. See Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 215 (“In reaching to the limits of Article III, subsection 
(a) codifies supplemental jurisdiction at the outer constitutional boundary that existed before 
Finley’s statutory revisionism.”).  Of course, the restrictions to this grant of constitutional 
proportions contained in subpart (b) only apply to diversity cases.  Thus, supplemental jurisdiction 
now exists up to the full limit of the constitution—that is, subject only to the Gibbs’ transaction or 
occurrence test—in cases where original jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question. 
 102. It must be remembered that, with respect to the federal district courts, Congress may 
choose to grant or withhold subject matter jurisdiction with few, if any, limitations: 
[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution, is 
(except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to [the Supreme] Court) 
dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely 
upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals 
(inferior to the Supreme Court), for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing 
them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding 
jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem 
proper for the public good. 
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845).  Although there has been some debate about whether 
Congress could, from a constitutional perspective, entirely withhold subject matter jurisdiction from 
the district courts, “[n]early two centuries stand in the way of those who would claim that Congress 
must vest the entire judicial power.” WRIGHT, supra note 52, § 10 at 47.  For a general discussion, 
see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), where the Court opined on the ability of 
Congress to limit federal jurisdiction: 
[T]he judicial power of the United States . . . is . . .  dependent for its distribution and 
organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who 
possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) . . . and 
of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of 
withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which Congress to 
Congress may seem proper for the public good. 
Id. at 401 (quoting Cary, 44 U.S. at 245).  Thus, there is not much debate that Congress could grant 
supplemental jurisdiction up to the limits of the Constitution or disallow it altogether.  See also, 
Howard P. Fink, Supplemental Jurisdiction—Take It to the Limit!, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 164 (1998) 
(“Congress controls federal jurisdiction and can expand it or retract it, within constitutional limits, 
as it chooses to do so.”). 
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doctrine in diversity cases, as follows: 
[In diversity cases] the district courts shall not have supplemental 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against 
persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as 
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as 
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.103 
Thus, for the diversity class of cases filed in or removed104 to 
federal district court, in order to analyze supplemental jurisdiction over 
any claims for which no original jurisdiction exists, one must first apply 
subpart (a) and then (b).  The first inquiry is fairly straightforward—at 
least with the benefit of nearly 40 years experience applying the Gibbs 
standard—asking whether the additional claim is so closely related to the 
anchor claim105 for which original jurisdiction exists that it forms part of 
the same constitutional “case or controversy.”106  As the last sentence in 
subpart (a) makes clear, this analysis applies the same regardless of 
whether one is talking about claims against additional parties or 
additional claims against the same party.107  For federal question cases, 
this is the end of the supplemental jurisdiction analysis.108  For diversity 
cases, one must then seek to apply the limitations provided for in subpart 
(b).  This latter analysis is where most of the controversy—often 
heated—surrounding § 1367 has arisen. 
While much of the hubbub about § 1367 has expressed concern 
with it opening the floodgates of the federal courts to diversity cases, the 
truth is that the statute has been more of a mixed bag.  As one 
commentator noted, the statute impacts the caselaw doctrines of pendent 
and ancillary jurisdiction by “strengthening them in some respects but 
 
 103. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 
 104. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the standards for supplemental jurisdiction set 
forth in § 1367 apply with equal force with respect to both lawsuits filed originally in federal court 
and those filed in state court and removed to federal court.  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. 
of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997). 
 105. The Practice Commentary published with § 1367 refers to the anchor claim as the 
“jurisdictional crutch.”  DAVID D. SIEGEL, COMMENTARY ON THE 1988 REVISION TO SECTION 1367, 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). 
 106. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1. 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
 108. Of course, the district courts are expressly given discretion under subpart (c) to consider 
possible dismissal or remand under the appropriate circumstances. 
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perhaps weakening them in others.”109  In any event, scholars would not 
continue to assert that § 1367 achieved merely a codification of the prior 
caselaw.  As will be seen below, however, the more significant changes 
to § 1367 do not spell doom for the federal courts, but actually offer 
some improvements to the prior caselaw in the area. 
III. EARLY REACTION BY COMMENTATORS TO THE STATUTE 
With very little fanfare, § 1367 was enacted into law effective, 
December 1, 1990.110 Other than legislatively overruling the Supreme 
Court’s restrictive holding in Finley, the prevailing thought at the time of 
its enactment seemed to be that it would merely codify and reaffirm 
existing caselaw from pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the single 
umbrella of supplemental jurisdiction.111  In a sort of “famous last 
words” article written by three of the primary scholarly drafters of § 
1367, the measure was treated as a mere codification of the doctrine as it 
existed before Finley: 
With few exceptions discussed below, section 1367 codifies 
supplemental jurisdiction as it existed before the Finley decision. . . . 
In order to repair Finley’s damage in a noncontroversial manner 
without expanding the scope of diversity jurisdiction, the statutory 
measure was therefore framed to restore and regularize supplemental 
jurisdiction, not to revamp it.112 
The silence surrounding the enactment of the statute was brief as 
legal scholars began analyzing the statute’s text and seeing results 
different from the pre-Finley days.113  Professor Freer led the early 
 
 109. SIEGEL, supra note 105. 
 110. The statute was a part of the Federal Court Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, 
150 Cong. Rec. H13301-07 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990), which implemented certain, though not all, 
recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee.  The most notable recommendation of 
the committee, rejected by the new statute, was a call for the demise of all diversity jurisdiction.  
See STUDY COMM. REPORT, supra note 90, at 176. 
 111. See generally Rowe et al., supra note 4, at 214-15.  See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 
88, § 114 (“This section would authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as essentially 
restore the pre-Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on other forms of 
supplemental jurisdiction.”). 
 112. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 88, at 176. 
 113. See, e.g., 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 0.97[5], at 928 
(referring to congressional “sloth in drafting the supplemental jurisdiction statute”); Arthur & Freer, 
Government Work, supra note 6, at 1007 (noting that the statute was a “nightmare of 
draftsmanship”); Freer, Compounding, supra note 6, at 471 (opining that Congress passed § 1367 
too quickly); Karen N. Moore, Colloquium, Perspectives on Supplemental Jurisdiction: The 
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal 
Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31, 56-58 (1992) (observing § 1367’s ambiguity and blaming it on its 
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chorus of attacks on the statute, observing among the many perceived 
problems with the statute, the following: 
In the guise of a non-controversial bill aimed at fixing a problem 
caused by the Supreme Court and codifying pre-Finley practice, the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute greatly extends the anti-diversity 
effect of Kroger, maiming efficient packaging of diversity cases.  The 
statute has several presumably unforeseen consequences as well, such 
as precluding supplemental jurisdiction in alienage cases and 
confusing areas that had been relatively clear even in the aftermath of 
Finley.114 
One of the areas of “unforeseen consequences” detected by 
Professor Freer was the omission of Rule 23 from § 1367(b)’s 
enumerated exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction and his observation 
that this suggested the abolition of preexisting law that served to limit 
diversity class actions from federal court.115  The academics that helped 
draft the statute116 admitted that the statute was “not perfect”117 but, in 
response to the spreading criticism of it, expressed their “hope”118 that 
the federal courts could be “trusted to make the best of it.”119 With 
regard to the problem spotted by Professor Freer concerning § 1367(b) 
and class actions, they admitted that “[i]t would have been better had the 
statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was 
an attempt to correct the oversight.”120  In sum, however, the statute’s 
drafters believed that the legislative history behind the statute would 
serve to fill in any perceived gaps or errors in the statute’s text.121  This 
response did not silence the statute’s critics however.122  Finally, even 
the statute’s primary scholarly drafter has now come full circle and has 
suggested his own recodification of supplemental jurisdiction.123 
 
congressional and scholarly drafters). 
 114. Freer, Compounding, supra note 6, at 471.  Recounting the background facts in the 
enactment of § 1367 and observing the relative speed of its passage through Congress, Professor 
Freer opined that its “haste” in passage may have led to many problems.  Id. at 486. 
 115. Id. at 485-86.  Also see the discussion of Zahn v. International Paper Co. in the next 
section of this article. 
 116. See supra notes 93-96, 110, and accompanying text. 
 117. Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 93, at 961. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 961 n.90. 
 121. Id. at 961 n.91 (discussing problems with Rule 23 and Rule 20 joinder situations). 
 122. The American Law Institute has generated its own proposed rewriting of § 1367.  See 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
1998). 
 123. Rowe, supra note 2, at 54 (suggesting a modified version of § 1367 “in light of the 
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IV.  COURTS’ GRAPPLING WITH § 1367 
This article does not purport to analyze every interpretational issue 
arising under § 1367.  Instead, the article will focus initially upon two 
primary battlegrounds in the interpretational struggle: Rule 23 class 
actions and Rule 20 joinder of plaintiffs.  These areas were chosen 
because the federal circuit court opinions to address whether a textual 
approach to the interpretation of § 1367 is required have all arisen in one 
of these two contexts.  Further, the cases arising in these two contexts 
highlight some of the most important, and controversial, legal issues that 
exist regarding § 1367 and they showcase the battle behind the battle—
federal district and intermediate appellate courts’ reluctance to permit 
Congress to carry out its constitutionally delegated task of defining the 
parameters of the inferior federal courts’ jurisdictional powers.  
Following the discussion of these two contexts, this article will examine 
whether a consistent interpretation of § 1367 can be then applied to a 
few other hotly debated interpretational issues under the statute without 
upsetting the business of the federal courts. 
A. Rule 23 Class Actions 
The one area that has undoubtedly received the most attention124 of 
the federal district and circuit courts of appeal relates to diversity class 
actions and to what extent § 1367 alters the traditional § 1332 
requirements for federal court jurisdiction.  Cases brought pursuant to 
the federal courts’ diversity power, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, require two 
elements as the Supreme Court has interpreted that statute: (a) complete 
diversity of citizenship among the parties;125 and (b) an amount in 
 
critiques, judicial experience, and policy considerations”). 
 124. “The current state of the law relating to the issue of supplemental jurisdiction in the class 
action context ‘has vexed and split federal courts across the country.’” Forest v. Penn Treaty Am. 
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that § 1367 overrules Zahn but that 
the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332 cannot be met solely through the claims of an 
unnamed class member) (quoting Klempner v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 196 F. 
Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (S.D. Fla. 2001)). 
 125. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806). Of course, Strawbridge is subject to 
criticism because the Court ignored the fact that the statute was worded almost identically to Article 
III of the Constitution which the Court has acknowledged does not require complete diversity of 
citizenship.  Indeed, if the Constitution mandated the result in Strawbridge, then it would not be 
possible to have diversity jurisdiction in areas such as statutory interpleader.  Further, congressional 
legislation such as the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiform Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1397, or the proposed Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. Rpt. 108-144 (June 9, 2003)—each of which only requires minimal 
diversity—would be impermissible. 
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controversy for each claimants’ claim in excess of $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs.126  As discussed below, it would be fair to characterize 
the Supreme Court’s application of these statutory requirements to class 
actions as schizophrenic. 
1. Judicial Origins and Evolution 
With regard to the requirement for complete diversity, the Supreme 
Court has made clear the general rule that each plaintiff must have 
diverse citizenship from each defendant.127  The question before the 
Supreme Court in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble128 was how that 
rule would apply to a class action where some of the unnamed members 
of the class were not diverse from the named defendants.  In that case, 
the plaintiffs were citizens of Kentucky and the named defendants were 
Indiana citizens.  However, members of the plaintiff-class included 
Indiana citizens.  Stressing that the named plaintiffs were acting as 
representatives for the unnamed, Indiana class members, the Court found 
that the presence in the class of those Indiana citizens did not oust the 
district court’s jurisdiction over the case: “Diversity of citizenship gave 
the district court jurisdiction.  Indiana citizens were of the class 
represented; their rights were duly represented by those before the 
court.”129 
In reaching this decision, the Court never acknowledged the fact 
that such an extension of diversity jurisdiction would arguably 
undermine the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge and the 
Court never explicitly urged that its decision rested upon the concept of 
pendent party or ancillary jurisdiction.  Rather, the decision seemed to 
be premised on the assumption that unnamed members of the class, only 
being present in the form of the named plaintiff’s representative 
capacity, were not really parties to the case.  Further, the decision 
seemed to be a very pragmatic one; it is hard to imagine many large, 
multi-state class actions where every class member would be diverse 
from the defendant(s).  Unless the Court was to decide that it did not 
want such class actions in federal court, the holding in Ben-Hur would 
seem to be necessary.  In any event, following Ben-Hur, the rule for over 
80 years has been to consider only the citizenship of named class 
representatives and to disregarded the citizenship of all others in the 
 
 126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(2). 
 127. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. at 267. 
 128. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
 129. Id. at 366. 
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class. 
The Supreme Court took a much different approach with the other 
diversity requirement—the amount in controversy.  For nearly a century, 
the Supreme Court has required that plaintiffs with separate and distinct 
claims each satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement for suits in 
federal court.130  The classic statement of this non-aggregation rule was 
articulated in 1911 by the Supreme Court, as follows: 
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, 
unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that 
the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when 
several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they 
have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests 
collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.131 
In Snyder v. Harris132 the Court applied this non-aggregation rule to 
class actions for the first time.  In that case the Court held that the class 
members could not, in effect, pool their individual claims in order to get 
over the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332.133  In that case, 
none of the named plaintiffs alleged a claim that exceeded the requisite 
statutory amount.  The Court’s holding, therefore, did not appear to 
represent any radical departure from prior principles and was not 
inconsistent with Ben Hur.  After all, even Ben Hur required named 
representatives in a class action to have diversity of citizenship from the 
opposing party.  Four years later, however, the Supreme Court was faced 
with a situation seemingly not unlike that in Ben-Hur. 
In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,134 the named class 
representatives filed suit on behalf of over 200 lakefront property owners 
and lessees against International Paper for permitting harmful discharges 
of pollution from a local pulp and paper-making plant.  Although each 
named class representative was diverse from International Paper and—
individually—owned a claim valued at greater than $10,000, the district 
court had found that “to a legal certainty” not every individual property 
 
 130. See, e.g., Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1885) (applying the rule to federal 
appellate jurisdiction which, at the time, required a certain amount-in-controversy); Walter v. 
Northeastern R.R., 147 U.S. 370, 373 (1893) (applying this non-aggregation rule to the amount-in-
controversy requirement for federal district courts then in effect). 
 131. Troy Bank v. G.A Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911). 
 132. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
 133. The Supreme Court reached a logical corollary to this non-aggregation rule—litigants 
whose claims do not satisfy the statutory minimum must be dismissed even though other claimants 
assert claims sufficient to invoke the federal court’s jurisdiction.  See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 
U.S. 583 (1939). 
 134. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
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owner in the class had suffered pollution damages in excess of 
$10,000.135  Since the absent class members were no more parties in 
Zahn than they were in Ben-Hur, one could anticipate the Court holding 
that subject matter jurisdiction existed for all of the claims in the 
putative class action.  The Court, however, reached a contrary holding.  
Disingenuously, the Supreme Court said that the holding in Snyder 
dictated this result.  In fact, Snyder was not on point at all because in that 
case it was clear that no party plaintiff met the statutory requirements.  
Perhaps a bit more persuasively, the Court also turned to its holding in 
Clark136 that required every party making a claim to individually satisfy 
the amount-in-controversy requirement.137  But Clark never addressed 
the issue of whether an unnamed class member, who was being 
represented by a party plaintiff who did meet both of § 1332’s 
requirements, and who was not considered a party by the Court in Ben-
Hur with respect to § 1332’s diversity requirement, would nevertheless 
be treated as a party and required to individually meet § 1332’s amount-
in-controversy hurdle.  Rather than address these differences head-on, 
the Supreme Court was content to suggest that stare decisis dictated its 
holding.  Thus, with the misleadingly simple invocation of the lower 
court’s quote—”one plaintiff may not ride in on another’s coattails”138—
the Court held that unnamed class members each had to meet § 1332’s 
amount-in-controversy requirement.139 
There were a number of problems with the majority’s opinion in 
Zahn.  First, as mentioned above, there was no controlling precedent that 
necessitated the Court’s holding.  Indeed, the Court was addressing an 
open question that it had never before confronted.  Second, because the 
Court was merely construing an element of Congress’ statutory-grant of 
diversity jurisdiction, there was no Constitutional mandate for requiring 
that each aspect of a class action separately meet § 1332’s twin 
 
 135. Id. at 292.  The minimum amount required by § 1332 at that time was only $10,000.  This 
was later changed to $50,000 and then to the current minimum of $75,000. 
 136. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). 
 137. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1973). 
 138. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 139. In an ironic twist, the Supreme Court demanded that if Congress ever wanted to change 
this holding, it had to state such intention clearly in any subsequent legislation: 
[H]ad there been any thought [by Congress] of departing from these decisions and, in so 
doing, of calling into question the accepted approach to cases involving ordinary joinder 
of plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims, some express statement of that intention 
would surely have appeared, either in the amendments themselves or in the official 
commentaries.  But we find not a trace to this effect.  As the Court thought in Snyder v. 
Harris, the matter must rest there, absent further congressional action. 
Zahn, 414 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added). 
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requirements.  Third, the Court never mentioned the concept of pendent 
or ancillary jurisdiction.  Most, if not all, cases meeting Rule 23’s 
thresholds for maintenance of a class action will necessarily meet Gibbs’ 
test for relatedness and, therefore, no constitutional hurdles would have 
precluded the Court from permitting the federal district court to have 
exercised pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over the smaller claims by 
some of the unnamed class members.  Fourth, and perhaps most 
disturbing, the Court never even recognized the anomaly it was creating 
in applying § 1332 to class actions.  For purpose of § 1332’s diversity 
requirement, the Court had held (in Ben-Hur) that absent class members 
were not really parties and need not demonstrate any diversity of 
citizenship.  On the other hand, with respect to § 1332’s amount-in-
controversy requirement, the Court in Zahn held that the absent class 
members were really parties who each must demonstrate the requisite 
amount-in-controversy or suffer dismissal.140  One would think that if 
the Court was going to take a stricter view of either of § 1332’s dual 
elements, then it would impose the tougher burden on the diversity 
requirement than on the amount-in-controversy.  After all, only the 
former has any constitutional mandate while the latter is merely 
Congress’ administrative screen for keeping some smaller cases out of 
the federal court system.  Instead, the Supreme Court held, in effect, that 
the diversity requirement—as applied to class actions—was less 
important than the amount-in-controversy requirement.  Justice 
Brennan’s dissent (joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall) eloquently 
highlighted this anomaly: 
Particularly in view of the constitutional background on which the 
statutory diversity requirements are written, it is difficult to understand 
why the practical approach the Court took in Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur must be abandoned where the purely statutory “matter in 
controversy” requirement is concerned.141 
For at least some of these reasons, Zahn has been the frequent 
subject of criticism from legal scholars,142 including those who helped to 
 
 140. For cases originally filed in federal court, the result in this instance would be the dismissal 
of any claims not meeting § 1332’s requirements or the refusal by the district court to certify all 
such holders of small claims as members of a class.  On the other hand, for cases removed from 
state to federal court, the result of unnamed class members failing to meet § 1332’s amount-in-
controversy requirement would be a remand of the entire action to state court.  This is true because 
the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, requires that the entire case be within the court’s original 
jurisdiction in order to remove the case. 
 141. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 142. MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 113, at 928; Arthur & Freer, Government Work, 
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draft the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, one of whom has stated that 
Zahn “has few defenders.”143 
2. Impact of § 1367 
The specific issue faced first by the Fifth Circuit in 1995 was 
whether Congress’ enactment of § 1367 legislatively overruled the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Zahn.  In re Abbott Laboratories144 was a 
state-law antitrust class action filed in Louisiana state court against 
manufacturers of infant formula, alleging price-fixing.  The defendants 
removed the case, citing diversity of citizenship, and the district court 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand on abstention grounds.145  The 
named plaintiffs were completely diverse from the defendants and, 
according to the district court, also met §1332’s amount-in-controversy 
requirement.146  Thus, had the case not been a class action it is clear that 
subject matter jurisdiction would not have been an issue on appeal.  
However, the plaintiffs sought the certification of a plaintiff class of 
consumers, perhaps none of whom would have had a claim sufficient to 
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of §1332.  (Per the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Ben-Hur the absent class members’ 
citizenship was of no import in determining whether § 1332’s complete-
 
supra note 6, at 1008 n.6 (“Abrogating Zahn would hardly be absurd.”); HOWARD P. FINK, LINDA 
S. MULLENIX, THIMAS D. ROWE, JR. & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 404 (2d ed. LexisNexis 2002) (“Those requirements schizophrenically look to the  
citizenship of only the named class representatives for purposes of determining diversity of 
citizenship . . . but require that each class member with a legally separate claim independently 
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.”). 
 143. Rowe, supra note 2, at 63. 
 144. 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided court, sub nom., Free v. Abbott 
Labs, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curium).  Justice O’Connor recused herself from this proceeding. 
 145. Because the remand was premised on discretionary grounds, rather than lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the remand 
order.  Id. at 525-26. 
 146. The district court found that the named plaintiffs’ claims were large enough because, 
under Louisiana law, all of the class’s attorney’s fees could be attributed to the named plaintiffs.  Id. 
at 526.  The named plaintiffs’ own damages were only $20,000 without including the attorney’s 
fees.  Prior to Abbott Labs, only one circuit had faced the issue of whether to aggregate the class’s 
attorney’s fees to the name representatives or to distribute them across the entire class pro rata.  See 
Goldberg v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that attributing the class’ 
attorney’s fees to the named plaintiffs rather than pro rata to the entire class would “conflict” with 
Zahn.).  Despite the fact that many district courts had since followed the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth 
Circuit held that that, upon examination of the particular Louisiana attorney’s fee statute at issue in 
that case, the named representatives would, if victorious, be entitled to recover all of the attorney’s 
fees incurred in prosecuting the class action.  Just because this meant that the named plaintiffs had 
claims in excess of § 1332’s requirement did nothing to frustrate Zahn’s requirement that, generally, 
the rule against aggregation applied to class actions.  Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 527. 
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diversity hurdle had been cleared.  Therefore, the case presented no 
diversity issues for jurisdictional purposes.)  In other words, this case 
was—from a jurisdictional perspective—exactly the same as presented 
by Zahn twenty-two years earlier.  The only possible difference was the 
1990 enactment of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute.  The Fifth 
Circuit had to address the issue, therefore, of whether this statute 
changed the holding in Zahn. 
In Abbott Labs, the Fifth Circuit succinctly framed the issue as 
follows: 
Defendants argue that Congress changed the jurisdictional landscape in 
1990 by enacting § 1367.  Section 1367(a) grants district courts 
supplemental jurisdiction over related claims generally, and § 1367(b) 
carves exceptions.  Significantly, class actions are not among the 
exceptions.147 
. . . 
Some commentators have interpreted this silence to mean that 
Congress overruled Zahn and granted supplemental jurisdiction over 
the claims of class members who individually do not demand the 
necessary amount in controversy.  Some of § 1367’s drafters disagree.  
No appellate court has ruled on the question yet.  The district courts 
are split even within this circuit, although the majority appear to hold 
that Zahn survives the enactment of § 1367.148 
For the Fifth Circuit, the application of the language of § 1367 
made the result exceedingly clear—because the class members’ claims 
were part of the same constitutional case as the named plaintiffs’ claims 
and were, therefore, within § 1367(a)’s broad grant, the only way the 
district court could have lacked jurisdiction would be if the case fell 
within one of subpart (b)’s enumerated exceptions.  It was not, as § 
1367(b) nowhere mentions Rule 23 joinder in its exclusive list of 
exceptions to subpart (a)’s grant.  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit asserted 
that the only way to reach a different result would be if it were free to 
search the legislative history to trump the language of the statute. 
The court held that it could resort to the legislative history in a 
search for a possible contrary intent in two limited circumstances: (i) if it 
found the statute “unclear or ambiguous”149 or if applying the “plain 
language” of the statute would result in a “positively absurd result.”150  
 
 147. Id. at 527. 
 148. Id. at 527-28. 
 149. Id. at 528. 
 150. Id. at 529 (citing West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 
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According to the Fifth Circuit, there was nothing ambiguous about the 
statute as applied to the facts in that case.151  Further, while the court did 
not necessarily endorse the wisdom behind the statute, it held that it was 
not “absurd” for the statute to overrule Zahn.  The court’s conclusion on 
this point was bolstered by the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in 
Zahn.152  Indeed, in light of the problems with Zahn enumerated 
above,153 there is a much more persuasive argument that § 1367’s 
overruling of Zahn was sensible. 
The holding in Abbott Labs was not unforeseen in light of the 
scholarly opinions issued in the wake of § 1367’s enactment that Zahn 
was dead.154  The most remarkable thing about the Fifth Circuit’s 
treatment of the issue was the self-discipline the court displayed in 
analyzing the statute.  The court commented upon the legislative history 
which suggested that Congress never intended to modify Zahn, stating 
that “[p]erhaps by some measure of transcending its language, Congress 
did not intend the Judicial Improvements Act to overrule Zahn.”155  In 
fact, the court noted that “[o]mitting the class action from the exception 
[in subpart (b)] may have been a clerical error.”156  Nevertheless, the 
court felt obligated to give the statute the effect that its straightforward 
language required.157 
Before discussing the other circuits’ reactions to Abbott Labs, the 
subsequent history of that decision is noteworthy.  In Abbott Labs, the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether § 1367 
should be given a literal reading or whether its legislative history should 
trump its language.158  However, with Justice O’Connor recusing herself, 
the Court divided four-to-four on the issue and affirmed without opinion 
 
(1991) as “refusing to permit the Supreme Court’s perception of the ‘policy’ of the statute to 
overcome its ‘plain language,’” and United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), as 
“rejecting lower court’s ‘plain language’ reading of a statute where that reading would create a 
‘positively absurd’ result”). 
 151. Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 528. 
 152. Id. at 529. 
 153. See supra notes 169-43 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 84. 
 155. Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 528. 
 156. Id. The court also noted that the scholar-drafters of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute 
had fallen on their swords, conceding shortly after its passage that the statute was “not a perfect 
effort” at draftsmanship.  Id. 528 n.9 (citing Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas 
M. Mengler, A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991)). 
 157. Id at 528-529.  Despite the House Committee on the Judiciary’s characterization of the 
bill as a “noncontroversial” collection of “relatively modest proposals,” the court reasoned that the 
“statute is the sole repository of congressional intent where the statute is clear and does not demand 
an absurd result.”  Id. 
 158. Id. 
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or any other guidance.159  Having initiated this whole affair with its 
congressional dare in Finley, the Court was not able to resolve the 
present controversy over the ensuing litigation. 
The Tenth Circuit was the first to reach a contrary conclusion 
regarding how § 1367 should be interpreted in the class action 
context.160  In 1998, Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co.161 became the 
banner carrier for those courts unwilling to follow § 1367’s language.  
Leonhardt was a class action brought by sugar beet farmers against a 
sugar company asserting claims under the federal Agricultural Fair 
Practices Act (AFPA) and state law causes of action (breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, etc.).162  The district court had granted a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of the federal cause of action for failure to state a 
claim and then refused to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state 
law claims because not all unnamed members of the class had claims in 
excess of § 1332’s $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.163  The 
Tenth Circuit first upheld the lower court’s ruling dismissing the AFPA 
claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
With respect to the issue of whether supplemental jurisdiction 
existed over the remaining state law claims, the Tenth Circuit stated that 
the test for whether it should look solely to the statute’s language was 
“whether Congress has spoken ‘in reasonably plain terms.’”164  
According to that court, if there were a “split in the circuits” on the 
meaning of a statutory phrase, this permits some presumption of textual 
ambiguity.165  The court began its analysis, thusly, not by looking to the 
text of the statute but by canvassing the opinions of other courts and 
scholars, observing that the “majority of district courts addressing the 
 
 159. Free v. Abbott Labs, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curium). 
 160. As will be discussed in the next section, the Seventh Circuit was the next circuit to 
address the issue of whether the legislative history or the statute’s language should control, but that 
case arose in the context of Rule 20 joinder and not Rule 23.  See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).  Nevertheless, it certainly established the direction 
the Seventh Circuit would take on whether § 1367 must be interpreted according to its express 
terms.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 161. 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 162. Id. at 632-33. 
 163. Id.  Prior to the district court’s order of dismissal, the plaintiff had voluntarily withdrawn 
an additional count under the Sherman Act.  Actually, no named plaintiff alleged damages in excess 
of $75,000 at the time of the district court’s ruling.  However, one named plaintiff had requested 
leave to amend its complaint to add a punitive damage claim.  This claim would have elevated that 
plaintiff’s claim to an amount greater than $75,000.  The court did not grant leave because it held 
that it would be futile because the court would be unable to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the remaining claims in the suit under § 1367.  Id. at 633. 
 164. Id. at 638. 
 165. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 638. 
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issue” disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Abbott Labs166 and 
that “commentators and treatises [were] divided” on the issue.167  The 
implicit message in this survey was that the statute is likely ambiguous 
since there was no clear consensus of judicial and scholarly opinion 
regarding what the language meant.168 
Turning its attention to the statute’s language it concluded that “§ 
1367(a) and (b) can be read literally, and unambiguously, to require each 
plaintiff in a class action diversity case to satisfy the Zahn definition of 
‘matter in controversy’ and to individually meet the $75,000 
requirement.”169  To reach this conclusion, the Court assumed that 
subsection (b) only came into play when a party sought to add additional 
claims or parties to an existing lawsuit.  Relying upon the phrase 
“original jurisdiction” in subsection (a), the Tenth Circuit argued that 
district courts were required to have original jurisdiction over every 
claim involving every party in the original complaint in order to hear the 
matter.  In other words, the only place for the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction would be subsequent to the original case filing.170  As will be 
discussed below, the implications of this logic are far more unsettling 
than was the Supreme Court’s decision in Finley.171 
Rightly or wrongly, having justified in its own mind the propriety 
 
 166. Id. at 639 n.5 (citing eight district court cases).  See, e.g., Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1997)); Ren-Dan Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 952 F. Supp. 
370, 376 (W.D. La. 1997); McGowan v. Cadbury Schweppes, PLC, 941 F. Supp. 344, 347-48 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); DeCastro v. AWACS, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 541, 547 (D.N.J. 1996), appeal 
dismissed, 940 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1996); Blair v. Source One Mortgage Serv. Corp., 925 F. Supp. 
617, 622-624 (D. Minn. 1996); Snider v. Stimson Lumber Co., 914 F. Supp. 388, 389-92 (E.D. Cal. 
1996); Henkel v. ITT Bowest Corp., 872 F. Supp. 872, 875-79 (D. Kan. 1994); cf. Amundson & 
Assoc. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council of Comp. Ins., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1116, 1122-23 (D. Kan. 
1997) (arising in the opposite context where some of the unnamed class members met § 1332’s 
amount requirement but none of the named plaintiffs did). 
 167. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 639 n.6 (citing multiple scholars for comparison). Compare 5 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.07[3][c], at 23-47 (3d ed. 1998) 
(“The conclusion that Zahn remains good law is ultimately unconvincing . . . .”) and HERBERT B. 
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS vol. 2 § 6.11 at 598 (4th ed., West 2002) 
(“The Act’s probable overruling of Zahn is fully consistent with the reasoning of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee on whose recommendation the Act was adopted.”), with WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 3, § 3523.1 at 112 (“Perhaps the most compelling evidence from the legislative history that 
Section 1367 was not intended to overrule Zahn is not so much what is said in the history itself, but 
rather what is omitted.”). 
 168. Had the court carefully reviewed these authorities, however, it would have discovered that 
the courts and scholars opining that § 1367 did not overrule Zahn, did so not based upon the 
language in the statute but upon the legislative history.  Thus, just because these authorities reached 
the opinion that Zahn remained viable does not mean that the language of the statute is ambiguous. 
 169. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640. 
 170. Id. at 639. 
 171. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text. 
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of resort to legislative history, the Tenth Circuit quickly concluded that 
Congress never intended to broaden supplemental jurisdiction by 
overruling Zahn.172  In looking at the legislative history, the Tenth 
Circuit relied almost exclusively upon the House Report accompanying 
the Judicial Improvements Act, which stated that § 1367 “is not intended 
to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-
only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to 
[Finley].”173  The court then pointed out, in a footnote, that the House 
Report expressly cites Zahn as an example of that case law which was 
not intended to be disturbed by § 1367.174  Apparently anticipating 
possible criticism as a result of trumping the language of § 1367 through 
reliance on one footnote in a committee report, the Tenth Circuit 
defended its analysis by stating that this was an “unusual situation” 
because “the legislative history so clearly refutes the textualist analysis 
of [Abbott Labs].”175  In other words, while a statute’s language is 
normally supposed to guide its interpretation, when a court feels the 
legislative history strongly suggests a contrary result, the court should be 
free to judicially rewrite the statute. 
Similar to Leonhardt, the Eighth Circuit also reached the 
conclusion that Zahn survived the enactment of § 1367.  In Trimble v. 
Asarco, Inc.,176 that court considered the effect of § 1367(b)’s omission 
of Rule 23 from its enumerated exceptions.  The court fairly quickly 
reached the conclusion that § 1367 was unambiguous, finding the 
rationale in Leonhardt persuasive.  Further, the Eighth Circuit thought 
the last clause of § 1367(b) was important.  This last section provides 
that, with respect to the enumerated exceptions set forth in subpart (b), 
that district courts do not have supplemental jurisdiction when the 
presence of those additional claims would “be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”177  The Eighth Circuit 
believed this evidenced “a concern for preserving the historical and well-
established rules of diversity.”178  Because there existed at least an 
 
 172. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 637. 
 173. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 88, at 29. 
 174. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640 n.9.  Of course, as discussed below, that footnote first cites 
Ben-Hur as an example of the good case law that was intended to remain intact.  Ironically, Ben-
Hur establishes that unnamed class members are not parties under § 1332’s diversity analysis and is 
logically inconsistent with Zahn.  See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. 
 175. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640 n.9. 
 176. 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 177. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 
 178. Trimble, 232 F.3d at 962. 
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“arguable ambiguity,”179 the Eighth Circuit mentioned that it also agreed 
with Leonhardt’s review of legislative history to provide further support 
for its conclusion. 
After the decisions from the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, it was 
beginning to look as if the trend might favor Zahn’s continued 
viability.180  This apparent momentum changed dramatically when, 
within the course of a mere three days in the late summer of 2001, two 
other circuit courts embraced textualism,181 agreeing with the Fifth 
Circuit that § 1367 overruled Zahn. 
The first shoe dropped on August 20, 2001, in the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.182  That case represented a rare 
instance when the appeal of a district court’s order remanding the case to 
state court was proper.183  In Gibson the appeal was proper because the 
defendant was appealing from the district court’s order awarding 
sanctions against defendant for the “clearly frivolous” arguments for 
removal in what constituted its second attempt to remove the case from 
California state court.184  The Ninth Circuit found that it could review 
the order of sanctions even though it necessarily required the court to 
“address the merits” of the order of remand.185  The Ninth Circuit noted 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. One exception to this trend was the Seventh Circuit’s decision to extend its own plain 
meaning interpretation of § 1367 in the Rule 20 context to Rule 23 cases.  See infra notes 209-27 
and accompanying text.  See also In re Brand Name Prescr. Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 181. Textualism is a term applied to the belief that strict adherence solely to the text of a statute 
should be maintained when analyzing the statute for its “plain meaning.”  Justice Scalia is perhaps 
the most renowned advocate of this approach to statutory construction.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The 
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990) (discussing the prominence of Justice Scalia in this 
debate). 
 182. 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 183. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precludes, generally, the appeal of a federal district court order 
remanding a removed case to state court.  See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 
128 (1995). 
 184. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 932.  The proceedings of the case at the state court level are 
illustrative of the manipulation of the jurisdictional statutes by plaintiffs’ class counsel in many 
consumer class actions in order to stay under the federal court radar.  In that case, after realizing the 
defendant’s intent to attempt removal, the plaintiffs filed an amended state court complaint alleging 
that no plaintiff was seeking damages of $75,000.  Plaintiffs’ counsel would not enter into a binding 
stipulation to that effect.  Id. at 931.  To do so, of course, would deprive the plaintiffs of the ability 
to amend the complaint to increase the amount in controversy to a real figure once the one-year 
deadline on removing a diversity case had expired.  See 28 U.S.C. §1446(b).  Thus, on the eve of the 
one-year deadline to attempt removal and with plaintiffs’ counsel equivocating on the actual 
damages that might be sought, defendant’s counsel faced the choice of either waiving the client’s 
possible removal rights or responding to a motion for sanctions. 
 185. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 933. 
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an unusual dichotomy—the Fifth Circuit believed § 1367 had a plain 
meaning that resulted in overruling Zahn while the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits also believed it had a plain meaning but that Zahn survived the 
statute.186  The court addressed, and rejected, the two textual arguments 
originally espoused by the Tenth Circuit in Leonhardt.187  First, the court 
disagreed that the term “original jurisdiction” in § 1367(a) meant one 
thing in federal question cases and another in diversity cases.  The court 
reasoned that there was nothing in the statutory text to support this 
distinction and that, if this were accurate, it would render § 1367(b) 
mostly superfluous.188 
The second textual argument rejected by the Ninth Circuit relates to 
the last phrase of § 1367(b) concerning the need to limit its exceptions to 
instances where “exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims 
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332.”189  
As mentioned earlier, Leonardt used this phrase to make the general 
observation that Congress was concerned about not extending 
supplemental jurisdiction too far in diversity cases.  From this 
observation, the Tenth Circuit had implicitly concluded that the omission 
of Rule 23 from any mention in § 1367(b) must have been an 
unintentional error, thereby justifying the court writing that exclusion 
into the statute.190  The Ninth Circuit opined, however, that this last 
 
 186. Id. at 934. 
 187. Id. at 937-38. 
 188. Id. The court noted that, for example, with respect to Rule 20 joinder of defendants that 
most defendants are joined in the original complaint.  The court reasoned, therefore, that: 
The exclusion of joined claims against non-diverse defendants from the supplemental 
jurisdiction granted by subsection (a) indicates that such claims are covered by 
supplemental jurisdiction, for there would otherwise be no reason for subsection (b) to 
except them from supplemental jurisdiction. 
  In order for such claims to have been covered by supplemental jurisdiction, “original 
jurisdiction” under subsection (a) must be determined by looking to see if there was 
subject matter jurisdiction over any one claim in the complaint, rather than over all of the 
claims in the complaint. 
Id. at 936.  The court gave original credit for this argument to Professor James Pfander’s then-
unpublished article.  See Pfander, supra note 2.  The court also noted that even if the term “original 
jurisdiction” in subpart (a) referred to all claims in the complaint, this would still not alter the result 
in a class action because the mere filing of a class action really only amounts to a “would-be class 
action” until the time of certification of the class.  Id. at 937.  Thus, so long as the named plaintiff-
representatives were diverse from defendants and alleged a sufficient amount in controversy, 
“original jurisdiction” would exist without regard to the smaller claims of unnamed members of the 
plaintiff class.  Id. 
 189. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 
 190. See Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 60 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998).  The Third 
Circuit made this finding explicitly.  Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 221 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The omission of Rule 20 at that point is an unintentional drafting gap . . . .”). 
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provision operates to limit the reach of the exceptions to supplemental 
jurisdiction set forth in § 1367(b).  As such, it cannot enlarge the 
exceptions but only narrow them: 
We believe that the last phrase of subsection (b) means that there is 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim otherwise excepted from 
supplemental jurisdiction by subsection (b) if § 1332, as understood 
before the passage of § 1367, would have authorized jurisdiction over 
that claim.191 
Rejecting each of the Tenth Circuit’s textual arguments, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that “the text of § 1367 is clear, and that it confers 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of class members in a diversity 
class action when named plaintiffs have claims with an amount in 
controversy in excess of $75,000.”192  Because the text of the statute was 
clear and the result not “absurd,” the court did not believe it was 
necessary or appropriate to rely upon possibly conflicting statements 
from the statute’s legislative history to reach a different result.193 
Three days later, the Fourth Circuit reached the identical conclusion 
in Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc.194  Rosmer was a state-law class action brought 
by a plaintiff who was diverse in citizenship from the named defendant 
and who owned a claim in excess of § 1332’s $75,000 jurisdictional 
minimum.195  In an attempt to avoid removal and federal court scrunity 
over the putative class action, the plaintiff’s complaint specifically 
alleged that some class members had suffered damages less than 
$75,000 in actual and punitive damages.196  After the district court 
denied plaintiff’s motion to remand the removed action to state court, an 
interlocutory appeal was granted so the Fourth Circuit could decide 
whether § 1367 overruled Zahn.197  For the same reasons as the Ninth 
Circuit, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit’s textual 
arguments: “[W]e refuse to squint at § 1367(a) so hard that we lose sight 
of the statute’s plain meaning.”198  Not only did the Fourth Circuit 
believe that resort to the statute’s legislative history was not appropriate, 
it found the legislative history to be a mixed bag not clearly inconsistent 
 
 191. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938. 
 192. Id. at 939. 
 193. Id. at 940. 
 194. 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 195. Id. at 112. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (permitting district courts to certify such an order for 
interlocutory review). 
 198. Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 117. 
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with the text of the statute.199 
During the writing of this article, the Eleventh Circuit finally200 
addressed the issue of Zahn’s viability.  In Allapattah Services, Inc. v. 
Exxon Corp.,201 that court heard an interlocutory appeal following the 
entry of a judgment of liability from a jury trial of a class action against 
Exxon by its dealers.  After noting the split among the circuits, the 
Eleventh Circuit proceeded to explain its obligation to adhere to the 
“plain meaning” of the statute where its text dictated a clear and 
unambiguous result.202  Once its commitment to that rule of statutory 
interpretation was established, the Eleventh Circuit refused to accept the 
defendant’s invitation for the court to walk through the statute’s 
legislative history: “[W]e consistently have reiterated that the text of a 
statute controls and that we may not ‘consider legislative history when 
the statutory language is unambiguous.’”203  Resorting to several well 
accepted canons of statutory interpretation, the court in short order 
rejected the defendant’s Leonhardt-inspired textual interpretation204 and 
held that: “Because we do not believe that the text of the statute 
expresses any legislative intent to prevent district courts from exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity class actions, we decline to 
‘rewrite the statute to insert Rule 23 into § 1367(b)’s list of 
exceptions.’”205 
B. Rule 20 Joinder 
At the same time that the district and circuit courts have attempted 
to understand the significance behind § 1367(b)’s omission of Rule 23 
from its list of exceptions to the statute’s broad grant of jurisdiction, a 
smaller but still significant number of courts have also faced the issue in 
the Rule 20 context.  Similar tensions and themes from the Rule 23 cases 
are also found in the circumstance of attempts to join the claims of 
jurisdictionally small plaintiff’s claims under Rule 20. 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. The Eleventh Circuit had previously noted the issue on two separate occasions but had not 
been forced to resolve it.  Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d, 1255, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 
2000); Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1080 n.12 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 201. 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 202. Id. at 1258-64. 
 203. Id. at 1255 (quoting Valdivieso v. Atlas Air, Inc., 305 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2213 (2002)). 
 204. Id. at 1262. 
 205. Id. at 1256 (quoting Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 115). 
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1.  Clark Rule 
Somewhat similar to the holding in Zahn was the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.206  In that case, one of the named 
plaintiffs did not meet § 1332’s amount-in-controversy requirement 
while the other plaintiff’s claim was sufficient.  The Supreme Court held 
that there was no pendent party jurisdiction recognized in such a 
diversity case because each party plaintiff was required to independently 
meet § 1332’s requirements.207  Prior to the enactment of § 1367, Clark 
had been accepted as settled law and was not seriously questioned by 
any courts or commentators.208 
2. Impact of § 1367 on Clark 
The first circuit court to consider whether § 1367 deserved a plain 
language interpretation outside the class action context was the Seventh 
Circuit in the case of Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, 
Inc.209  Stromberg involved a Rule 20 joinder issue rather than Rule 23.  
Stromberg was a diversity case filed by two plaintiffs in federal district 
court for breach of contract and fraud.  While both plaintiffs had diverse 
citizenships from the defendants, only one of the two named plaintiffs 
had a claim that met §1332’s amount in controversy requirement.210  
Historically, such a situation would not permit the federal court to 
entertain the jurisdictionally small claim.  Just as the defendants had 
done in Abbott Labs,211 however, the plaintiff in Stromberg argued that § 
1367 had changed prior caselaw because subpart (b)’s exceptions did not 
refer to persons proposed to be joined under Rule 20.212 
The Seventh Circuit easily recognized the parallels between the 
Rule 20 context and the Rule 23 situation addressed by the Fifth Circuit 
in Abbott Labs.213  Because § 1367(b) neither excepts from subpart (a)’s 
 
 206. 306 U.S. 583 (1939). 
 207. Id. 
 208. WRIGHT, supra note 59, § 36 at 209-15 (5th ed. 1994). 
 209. 77 F.3d 928. 
 210. Id. at 930. 
 211. See supra notes 144-59 and accompanying text. 
 212. Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mech., 77 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 213. Id.  One district court observed that the decisions of the various district courts to consider 
§ 1367’s impact on Clark fell into line with how their respective circuits ruled on the issue of 
whether § 1367 overruled Zahn: 
Though only two appellate courts have addressed § 1367’s effect on the jurisdictional-
amount issue outside the context of class actions, many district courts have.  Generally, 
these decisions fall along the lines of Zahn.  If controlling circuit law is that Zahn was 
abrogated, district courts within that circuit have found that Clark was abrogated 
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broad jurisdictional grant claims joined under Rule 23 nor Rule 20, one 
would ordinarily expect similar results in the two situations.  In fact, the 
Seventh Circuit even characterized Abbott Labs as holding that § 1367 
overruled not just Zahn but Clark as well.214  Beginning its analysis with 
a careful reading of the text of the statute, the Seventh Circuit believed 
the last sentence of § 1367(a) was significant.215  The last sentence, of 
course, reaffirms Congress’ commitment for supplemental jurisdiction to 
include pendent party jurisdiction,216 as follows: “Such supplemental 
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention 
of additional parties.”217  The court believed that, even if the principle 
purpose behind this language was to reverse the Supreme Court’s 
unsavory holding in Finley, there was nothing in the text of the statute to 
limit pendent party jurisdiction to federal question cases.218  According 
to the Seventh Circuit, even if there existed legislative history suggesting 
that Congress never intended to overrule Zahn or Clark, “the text is not 
limited in this way.  When text and legislative history disagree, the text 
controls.”219 
The Seventh Circuit seemed to be compelled strongly to reach the 
same interpretation as the Fifth Circuit had in Abbott Labs.220  The court 
 
(whether making this finding expressly or implicitly), and they have further found that 
claims of pendent parties do not need to meet the jurisdictional amount . . . . If, however, 
controlling circuit law is that Zahn was not abrogated, the district courts within the 
circuit generally have held that the decision in Clark was not abrogated. 
Monroe v. Brown, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1296 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (holding that § 1367 overruled 
Clark). 
 214. Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930 
One court of appeals has held that § 1367 supersedes Clark and  allows pendent-party 
jurisdiction when the additional parties have claims worth less than $50,000 [citing 
Abbott Labs]. . .  (Actually, the fifth circuit held that § 1367 alters the result of Zahn, 414 
U.S. 291; we discuss below whether there is a material difference between Clark and 
Zahn.)  No other court of appeals has addressed this question; we recently remarked on 
its unsettled nature.  Anthony v. Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc., 75 F.3d 311, 
315-16 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1996).  Most district judges, within and without this circuit, have 
held that the old rule retains vitality. 
Id. 
 215. Id. at 931. 
 216. Most courts and commentators have noted that this last sentence was designed specifically 
to overrule the Supreme Court’s holding in Finley.  Id. 
 217. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
 218. Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930 (“Although the final sentence of § 1367(a) might have been 
designed to do nothing more than reverse the outcome of Finley, 490 U.S. 545, which held that 
pendent-party jurisdiction is unavailable when the principal claim arises under federal law, the text 
[of § 1367] is not limited to federal-question cases, and § 1367(b) shows that the statute governs 
diversity litigation as well.”). 
 219. Id. (citing In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 220. The Seventh Circuit noted at the inception of its analysis that it was “reluctant to create a 
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concluded that “Section 1367(a) has changed the basic rule by 
authorizing pendent party jurisdiction, and that change affects Clark and 
Zahn equally.”221  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit believed that applying this 
plain-reading of § 1367 to Rule 20 cases was less burdensome on the 
federal courts than the Fifth Circuit’s holding in class actions.  The 
Seventh Circuit explained the practical appeal of its extension of Abbott 
Labs’ holding: 
To the extent that practical considerations enter in, it is hard to avoid 
remarking that allowing thousands of small claims into federal court 
via the class device is a substantially greater expansion of jurisdiction 
than is allowing a single pendent party.  It is therefore easy to imagine 
wanting to overturn Clark but not Zahn; it is much harder to imagine 
wanting to overturn Zahn but not Clark, and we have no reason to 
believe that Congress harbored such a secret desire.222 
The Seventh Circuit was so committed to a strictly textual reading 
of § 1367 that it was willing to apply the statutory language even in the 
face of two strong counterarguments: (1) the threat the court perceived 
that its holding could logically undermine the Strawbridge complete 
diversity rule; and (2) the apparent anomaly it believed was present in 
the exceptions enumerated in § 1367(b). 
With regard to the former, the Seventh Circuit observed that 
“supplemental jurisdiction has the potential to move from complete to 
minimal diversity.”223  The apparent suggestion from the court was that 
if a claim for less than the jurisdictional minimum could be added under 
Rule 20 to a diversity claim for which original jurisdiction existed, there 
was nothing in the language of § 1367 to preclude the joinder under Rule 
20 of an additional plaintiff who was not diverse from the existing 
defendant.  The court also observed the “apparent incongruity” of § 
1367(b) permitting supplemental jurisdiction for claims by plaintiffs 
joined under Rule 20 but withholding supplemental jurisdiction for 
claims against parties joined as defendants under Rule 20.224  In 
 
conflict among the circuits on a jurisdictional issue.  We follow Abbot Laboratories, which has 
strong support from the statutory text.”  Id. at 930. 
 221. Id. at 931. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id at 932. 
 224. In other words, the court believed the text of § 1367(b) compelled the following 
incongruity: 
Jurisdiction Permitted - -  but - -  Jurisdiction Prohibited 
Plaintiff #1 (Kan.) and Plaintiff #2 (Calif.) Plaintiff (Calif.) 
 v.  v. 
Defendant (Calif.)  Deft. #1 (Kan.) and Deft. #2 (Calif.) 
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remarkable candor, the Seventh Circuit even admitted that “[w]hether § 
1367(b) is a model drafting exercise may be doubted.”225 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit declined the defendants’ 
invitation to be guided by anything other than the text of the statute.  
Rather than focus on problems created in future cases by its holding, the 
Court opined that the present application of the statute to the case before 
it in a way that permitted supplemental jurisdiction over the smaller 
claims of the second plaintiff was appropriate.  The court noted that the 
claims were closely related, having arisen out of the same construction 
project,226 and concluded that the application of § 1367 made sense in 
that case: 
This strikes us as exactly the sort of case in which pendent-party 
jurisdiction is appropriate.  It is two for the price of one: to decide 
either plaintiff’s claim is to decide both, and neither private interests 
nor judicial economy would be promoted by resolving Stromberg’s 
claim in federal court while trundling Comfort Control off to state 
court to get a second opinion.227 
In stark contrast with the Seventh Circuit’s commitment to 
textualism even in the face of possible drastic consequences, the Third 
Circuit showed minimal regard for honoring the text of § 1367 in the 
same Rule 20 context.  In Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance 
Co.,228 the Third Circuit followed Leonhardt’s damn-the-language  
approach in the Rule 20 joinder context.  One plaintiff corporation in the 
diversity case had a claim in excess of §1332’s then-in-effect $50,000 
amount in controversy requirement, but the second plaintiff (a subsidiary 
of the other plaintiff) did not and there was no exception to the rule 
against aggregation of damages that was applicable.229  Both claims 
arose out of the same incident (the collapse of a roof and a common 
insurance coverage issue),230 and the Gibbs’ test under § 1367(a) was 
seemingly satisfied.  Just as with the issue in the class action context, the 
court grappled with the fact that subpart (b) did not mention plaintiffs 
joined under Rule 20 as an exception to subpart (a)’s broad grant of 
supplemental jurisdiction. 
Prior to engaging in a predicate discussion of whether it was 
appropriate to rely upon legislative history, and without attempting any 
 
 225. Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 229. Id. at 218. 
 230. Id. 
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literal application of the statute’s language, the Third Circuit launched 
into a detailed discussion of § 1367’s legislative history.231  Similar to 
the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, the Third Circuit found persuasive the 
House Committee’s Report which, in a footnote, stated that the 
committee intended for the statute to permit the holdings in both Zahn 
and Ben-Hur to remain viable.232  Of course, the House Committee 
Report never mentioned the continued viability of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Clark233 that prohibited the joinder of a claim too small under 
§ 1332 with one that met the amount in controversy standard.  Implicit in 
the Third Circuit’s opinion was that the analyses for Rule 20 and Rule 
23 joinder under § 1367 should be treated the same. 
The Third Circuit was particularly impressed with the fact that the 
statute contemplated a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction for 
federal question cases (through subpart (a)) with a more limited grant 
being available in diversity cases (through subpart (b)).  This suggested 
to the Third Circuit: “Section 1367 was not intended to substantially 
expand diversity jurisdiction.  Setting aside the holding in Zahn and 
Clark would have such an effect.”234  This conclusion, bolstered by the 
legislative history in the House Committee Report,235 led the Third 
Circuit to the conclusion that the “omission of Rule 20 [in § 1367(b)’s 
exceptions] is an unintentional drafting gap.”236 
Of the three minority circuits to reject the textualist approach to 
interpreting § 1367, the Third Circuit showed the least regard for the text 
of § 1367.  The Third Circuit effectively treated subpart (b)’s exceptions 
as mere examples of Congress’ desire not to permit too broad an 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases and supported 
this conclusion with its  review of the statute’s legislative history.  That 
court never once attempted to parse the language of the statute to 
determine what result its plain-language application would have 
achieved. 
 
 231. Id. at 221, 219-20. 
 232. Id. at 220. 
 233. H.R. RPT. 101-734, 2d Sess. (1990). 
 234. Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 221. 
 235. The Third Circuit felt that the legislative history provided “more than adequate evidence 
that Congress did not intend to allow such an obvious evasion of the diversity statute.”  Id. at 221 
n.6.  The court also cited the conclusions of Professor Rowe that the legislative history was 
sufficient to fill the presumed ambiguity in the face of § 1367(b).  See Rowe, Reply, supra note 93, 
at 960 n.90. 
 236. Meritcare, 166 F.3d at n.6. 
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C. The Advantages of the Textual Interpretation of § 1367 
Taking into account both the Rule 23 and Rule 20 contexts, the 
circuits are currently split five to three on whether the “plain language” 
of § 1367 should be enforced or whether its legislative history should 
trump it to reach a result more consistent with preexisting case law.  The 
Fifth,237 Seventh,238 Ninth,239 Fourth,240 and Eleventh241 Circuits have 
found the statute’s text to be authoritative and have, therefore, enforced 
it according to its clear terms even when that compelled a holding at 
odds with prior caselaw and even, perhaps, against the personal 
preferences242 of the judges on those panels.  By contrast, the Tenth and 
Eighth Circuits used contrived and allegedly “unambiguous” readings of 
§ 1367 to reach a result consistent with prior caselaw.243  Those courts 
were so concerned about the fallacy of their interpretation of the text, 
however, that they were quick to fall back on the statute’s legislative 
history—namely, the House Committee Report—to justify the 
jurisdiction-restrictive result they reached.  The Third Circuit ignored the 
text of the statute and used its legislative history to find ambiguity in its 
meaning and to reach the same result as the Tenth and Eighth Circuits.244  
The First and Second245 Circuits have each acknowledged the issue but 
have not yet ruled upon it.  The Supreme Court, as indicated earlier, has 
failed in its one attempt to resolve this basic interpretational issue.  
Given the divergence of approaches to the Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Statute, what lesson can be learned about how future courts should 
interpret it? 
The nearly universally acknowledged246 canon for statutory 
 
 237. In re Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 238. Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Brand 
Name Prescr. Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 239. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 240. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 241. Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 242. See, e.g., Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932.  Noting certain incongruities in the application of § 
1367(b), the court asked “What sense can this make?”  Id.  Later the court expressed its doubts that 
the statute was “a model drafting exercise.”  Id. 
 243. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Novel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 297-98 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(observing that the issue was complex but that it was not necessary to decide it to resolve the appeal 
in that case). 
 246. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 46 (6th rev. ed., 
West 2000) (listing courts throughout the United States that at least purport to apply the “plain 
meaning” rule as their primary canon of statutory construction).  But cf. Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 
651 (Alaska App. 1990) (“Alaska no longer adheres to a plain meaning rule.”). 
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interpretation in the United States is the so-called “plain meaning rule” 
which generally means that a court is to “follow the plain meaning of the 
statutory text, except when the text suggests an absurd result or a 
scrivener’s error.”247  Professor Singer’s textbook on the subject of 
statutory interpretation provides a concise statement of the rule, as 
follows: 
A basic insight about the process of communication was given classic 
expression by the Supreme Court of the United States when it declared 
that “the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in 
the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.248  This 
generally means when the language of the statute is clear and not 
unreasonable or illogical in its operation, the court may not go outside 
the statute to give it a different meaning.249 
Indeed, even with their different results, each of the eight circuits to take 
a stand on how § 1367 should be interpreted has at least agreed that the 
plain meaning rule is supposed to govern their interpretation of the 
statute.250  While there are certainly competing schools of thought 
among academics about whether the plain meaning rule ought to be 
 
 247. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, AND ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 375 (Foundation Press 2000). 
 248. SINGER, supra note 246, at 113-18 (citing, among other sources, Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 529 (“But the statute is the sole repository of congressional 
intent where the statute is clear and does not demand an absurd result.”); Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931 
(“When text and legislative history disagree, the text controls.”); Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938 (“Courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”); 
Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 117 (“The Supreme Court, however, has consistently stated that when a statute 
is plain on its face, a court’s inquiry is at an end.  ‘The legislative intent of Congress is to be derived 
from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the assertions of codifiers 
directly at odds with clear statutory language.’”) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268 
n.6 (1997)); Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 638 (“We first examine the statutory language and decide 
whether Congress has spoken ‘in reasonably plain terms.”); S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. 
Co., 151 F.3d 1251, 1257 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)) 
(“Where the will of Congress has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” (internal quotations omitted)); Trimble, 232 F.3d at 961 (“If 
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we normally find that language conclusive . . . . If 
the language is ambiguous, however, we may ‘resort to legislative history as an aid to 
interpretation.”); Id. at 962 (“Thus, in our view § 1367(a) and (b) can be read literally, and 
unambiguously, to require each plaintiff in a class action diversity case to satisfy the Zahn definition 
of ‘matter in controversy’ and to individually meet the $75,000 requirement.”); Meritcare, 166 F.3d 
at 222 (“[W]e conclude that there is sufficient ambiguity in the statute to make resort to the 
legislative history appropriate.”); Allapattah, 333 F.3d at 1254 (“In construing a statute we must 
begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself.”). 
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followed,251 it is clear that the federal courts, led by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, pledge allegiance to this rule, even when departing from it in 
practice.252  Further, one can hardly begin to imagine the Pandora’s Box 
that might unfold if courts were to begin essentially adopting different 
rules of statutory construction for each statute, taking a peek into the 
purposes behind each statute before looking to its text, as has been 
suggested by Professor Pfander.253  Indeed, such an approach would not 
really amount to a canon of construction254 so much as an ex post facto 
rationalization of the result a particular court chose to uphold—hardly 
the sort of practice destined to promote predictability and to give 
deference to the legislators who voted in favor of the statutory text.255  
Professors Arthur and Freer, while not numbered among the few fans of 
§ 1367, are rational enough to understand why courts cannot ignore its 
plain mandates: 
First, basic principles of statutory construction militate against the 
drafters’ hopes.  It is not so easy for judges to ignore the specific 
commands of a statute in favor of “basic guidance” arguably gleaned 
from the vague statements found in legislative history.  Justice Scalia 
is leading a campaign to restore the primacy of statutory language, 
which, as he points out, is all that Congress actually adopts.  This 
campaign is a reaction against the perceived abuse of legislative 
history to construe statutes contrary to their enacted language.  In such 
cases, Scalia and others argue that it is by no means certain that 
Congress really “intended” the result.  In any event, Article I makes no 
provision for the enactment of legislative intent—other than the 
constitutional process of putting it into statutory language.256 
Assuming that federal courts will not suddenly abandon the plain 
 
 251. See generally supra notes 246-47. 
 252. See SINGER, supra note 246. 
 253. Pfander, supra note 2. 
 254. While there has been much scholarly criticism of not only the plain meaning canon but of 
other subservient canons, the courts do not seem to be particularly concerned.  See Richard A. 
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 
805 (1983) (“To exaggerate slightly, it has been many years since any legal scholar had a good 
word to say about any but one or two of the canons, but scholarly opinion  . . . has had little impact 
on the writing of judicial opinions, where the canons seem to be flourishing as vigorously as ever.”). 
 255. One justification for the plain meaning rule, particularly as applied by textualists, is that 
legislators who vote for a bill, and the chief executive who signs the bill into law, are not voting on 
legislative history or other personal observations of the drafters or other supporters of the 
legislation.  Therefore, to impose some alternative meaning on the statute at odds with the plain 
meaning of its text is undemocratic and, perhaps, implicates fundamental separation of powers 
concerns.  See SINGER, supra note 246; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 247. 
 256. Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 6, at 985-86. 
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meaning rule, as a realist must,257 one must then ask how should that rule 
apply to § 1367.  The emerging majority approach is certainly 
straightforward.  If the claim in question is part of the same 
constitutional case, subpart (a) provides for supplemental jurisdiction 
even when the claim involves the joinder of new parties (i.e., pendent 
party jurisdiction).258  If original jurisdiction is founded on diversity, one 
simply asks if the new claim arises in the context of one of the two 
groups of prohibited situations expressly proscribed by subpart (b).259  If 
the claim does not fall into those express categories, the majority 
approach holds that there is supplemental jurisdiction over that new 
claim.  It’s just that simple.  To the majority of circuits, it does not 
matter if this exercise of supplemental jurisdiction offends traditional 
notions of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction because, after all, Congress is 
free to expand supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of the 
Constitution.260  Congress certainly could have, after all, stopped its 
legislative drafting with the completion of subpart (a) as it chose to do in 
federal question cases.261  Even in diversity cases, therefore, Congress 
was free to permit federal courts to hear any claim forming part of the 
same constitutional case as the anchor claim over which original 
jurisdiction first attached. 
But while clearly the majority’s interpretation is reasonable, before 
one can hold that the statute is unambiguous, consideration must first be 
given to alternative suggested interpretations of that language.262  
 
 257. Id. at 987 (“While we doubt that the courts will discard the use of legislative history 
altogether, we do expect that they will begin to adhere more faithfully to the traditional rule that 
legislative history is used only to clarify ambiguities, not to alter what Congress did on the grounds 
that it surely ‘intended’ something else that better accords with the policy notions of commentators 
and courts.”) (citing Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in 
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 
277, 309-310 (1990)). 
 258. Section 1367(a), therefore, certainly overrules Finley and no court or commentator has 
suggested otherwise. 
 259. That is, one must ask whether the new claim arises out of either: (1) the joinder of 
defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14, 19, 20 or 24; or (2) the joinder of additional plaintiffs under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 or 24.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 
 260. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 556; supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 261. Id. 
 262. “The test for determining whether a statute is ambiguous is whether the statute is capable 
of being understood by reasonably well informed persons in two or more different senses.” SINGER, 
supra note 246, §46.04 at 151. This test is remarkably similar to the test used by most courts in 
deciding whether a contract is ambiguous—whether the contract text is “susceptible to more than 
one meaning.”  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.11 152 (5th ed. 
Thomson West 2003).  When courts find that the contract is not reasonably interpreted in more than 
one way, the “Plain Meaning Rule” is applied to enforce the result dictated by the contract’s text: 
“When the language of the contract is clear, the court will presume that the parties intended what 
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Among the three minority circuits that have held that § 1367’s text was 
impotent against the jurisdiction-restricting holdings of Zahn or Clark,263 
two portions of § 1367’s text are used to support their result.  The first 
textual counter-argument focuses upon the phrase “original jurisdiction” 
in subpart (a).  According to the Tenth Circuit,264 if original jurisdiction 
is founded upon diversity jurisdiction, each and every claim stated in the 
lawsuit must meet § 1332’s amount-in-controversy requirement.265  If all 
of the claims against all parties meet this standard, then subpart (a)’s 
“original jurisdiction” attaches.  Otherwise, there is no “original 
jurisdiction” and the case must be dismissed or, in a removed case, 
remanded to state court.266  Of course, in this instance there could be no 
potential exercise of supplemental jurisdiction at the outset of a diversity 
case for there would be no federal lawsuit pending. 
This “original jurisdiction” textual argument cannot possibly 
represent the “plain meaning” of the statute for several reasons.  First, 
this argument would implicitly require that that phrase mean one thing in 
a federal question case and another in a diversity case, which distinction 
finds no support in the statutory text.  No court has suggested that § 
1367 overrules Gibbs—the very paradigm267 of supplemental 
jurisdiction.  Yet if the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of “original 
jurisdiction” were applied equally to federal question and diversity 
cases, Gibbs would be overruled.  The Ninth Circuit illustrates this 
point: 
If a non-diverse plaintiff files a complaint with two transactionally 
related claims against a single defendant, one based on federal law and 
one based on state law, there is “original jurisdiction” under subsection 
(a) because there is subject matter jurisdiction over the federal-law 
 
they expressed, even if the expression differs from the parties’ [actual] intentions at the time they 
created the contract.”  Id. at 151 (quoting Nicholson Air Services v. Allegany County, 706 A.2d 124 
(Md. 1998).  Given the rough similarity of the plain meaning rule of statutory and contract 
interpretation, it is not surprising that so many academics and courts also bristle against application 
of the rule in contract disputes.  Id.  In fact, one could fairly easily marshal arguments that the plain 
meaning rule should apply with even greater force to statutes than contracts.  For example, statutes 
are enacted by larger numbers of individuals, legislative history does not include the views of all of 
those legislators, statutes have much broader impact, and the public has greater need to predict a 
statute’s impact. 
 263. See supra notes 158-81 and accompanying text (discussing Leonhardt and Trimble); 
supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text (discussing Meritcare). 
 264. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 927. 
 265. How the complete diversity requirement is to be applied is a different matter, discussed 
infra at Section V.1. 
 266. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment 
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 
 267. See SUBCOMM. REPORTS, supra note 55, at 548-49. 
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claim.  Because there is original jurisdiction, there is supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state-law claim.  The example just described is, of 
course, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966), the paradigm case of pendent (now 
supplemental) jurisdiction.  If Leonhardt’s definition of “original 
jurisdiction” were applied to federal question cases, § 1367 would 
overrule Gibbs.  Since no one, including the Leonhardt panel, argues 
that § 1367 has that consequence, the question is whether “original 
jurisdiction” in subsection (a) has a different meaning in diversity 
cases from its unquestioned meaning in federal question cases.268 
Not only would the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of “original 
jurisdiction” overrule Gibbs, as the Ninth Circuit demonstrates, the same 
logic would necessarily reinstate Finley. The only meaningful difference 
between the procedural posture of Finley and Gibbs was that the former 
involved the addition of a state-law claim against a new party (i.e., 
pendent party jurisdiction) whereas the latter only involved the addition 
of a state-law claim against a defendant already in the case (i.e., pendent 
claim jurisdiction).  One of the clear changes wrought by § 1367, 
however, was an end to the distinction between pendent party and 
pendent claim analysis in the federal question context.269  Thus, if the 
same interpretation of “original jurisdiction” the Tenth Circuit advocates 
for diversity cases is applied in the federal question context, § 1367(a) 
would not tolerate the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the Finley 
context, a very ironic result.270 
A shrewd reader might respond, however, that this author’s resort 
 
 268. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 935-36. 
 269. Section 1367(a) makes this clear with its last sentence: “Such supplemental jurisdiction 
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” 
 270. As the Fourth Circuit has observed, this unintended consequence of the Tenth Circuit’s 
“original jurisdiction” analysis is perhaps its undoing: 
More damaging to the Leonhardt court is the fact that under its analysis, § 1367 would 
not apply to cases such as Finley, the very case that prompted the enactment of the 
statute in the first instance.  If Leonhardt were correct, there would have been no original 
jurisdiction in Finley because the plaintiff did not have an independent jurisdictional 
basis for suing the non-diverse party in federal court. 
Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 116-17.  Another related argument implicit in the Tenth Circuit’s rationale is 
that, perhaps, “original jurisdiction” in § 1367(a) means original jurisdiction “over the whole action 
at the initiation of a complaint.”  Id. at 115.  However, this would preclude supplemental 
jurisdiction in the Gibbs’ scenario where a state claim is included in an original complaint with a 
related federal claim.  Further, there is nothing in § 1367 to indicate that supplemental jurisdiction is 
intended to apply only to the addition of claims subsequent to the filing of the original complaint.  
Id. at 116-17 (“[Plaintiff] urges us to read distinction after distinction into the term ‘original 
jurisdiction.’  But we refuse to squint too hard at § 1367(a) so hard that we lose sight of the statute’s 
plain meaning.”). 
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to reliance on the legislative purpose behind enacting § 1367 to defeat 
the minority view is no more analytically true to the textualist’s “plain 
meaning” rule than was the Tenth Circuit’s analysis.  Or put another 
way, if one is going to look at the legislative history behind § 1367, it is 
difficult to conclude that Congress intended to overrule Zahn and Clark.  
However, one hardly needs to depart from the text of § 1367 to reject the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis.  As stated above, there is no basis in the text of 
§ 1367(a) to distinguish between federal question and diversity cases in 
giving meaning to the phrase “original jurisdiction.”  Further, subpart (b) 
also refers to “original jurisdiction” in a sense that necessarily 
contemplates its application to cases where only some of the claims 
stated meet the requirements of § 1332, or else it would be entirely 
superfluous and would never have any application.271  Finally, there is 
simply no getting around the fact that the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning 
would have the effect of judicially rewriting § 1367(b) to include 
references to Rules 20 and 23 within its exceptions.272  Thus, 
Leonhardt’s strained textual distinction would unavoidably violate at 
least three accepted canons of statutory construction: (i) “[I]dentical 
terms within an Act bear the same meaning”;273 (ii) “Avoid interpreting 
a provision in a way that would render other provisions of the Act 
superfluous or unnecessary”;274 and (iii) “Do not create exceptions in 
addition to those specified by Congress.”275  Regardless of one’s 
fondness for the old days of Zahn and Clark, it is hard to condone such a 
strained interpretation of § 1367 to revive those holdings, particularly 
when—as noted above—it would effectively destroy Gibbs and 
resuscitate Finley in the process.  From a jurisprudential perspective, one 
would rather advocate ignoring the statutory text in favor of its 
legislative history than to distort statutory interpretation in a way that 
leads to a holding that undermines the central purposes of the statute.  
That is exactly what Leonhardt’s misguided textual analysis would 
do.276 
 
 271. Section 1367(b) only applies to diversity cases. 
 272. The Fourth Circuit made the same observation: “In effect, [the plaintiff] would have us 
rewrite the statute to insert Rule 23 into § 1367(b) list of exceptions.  This we cannot do.”  Rosmer, 
263 F.3d at 115. 
 273. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992); ESKRIDGE ET AL., 
supra note 247, at 376 (listing as one textual canon of statutory construction: “Interpret the same or 
similar terms in a statute the same way.”). 
 274. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 247, at 376. 
 275. Id. 
 276. In a recent essay, Professor Pfander takes issue with the decisions of the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits, rejecting Leonhardt’s “original jurisdiction” analysis.  See Pfander, supra note 14, at 1209.  
Professor Pfander demonstrates tremendous creativity in his effort to demonstrate the plausibility of 
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The only other textual argument advanced by the minority latches 
on to the last proviso in subpart (b)—”. . . when exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332”277—and transmogrifies it by 
effectively inserting it into the text of subpart (a) instead.  In this regard, 
the Tenth Circuit’s entire second textual argument consisted of the 
following: 
That very language evidences a concern for preserving the historical 
and well-established rules of diversity.  The fact that section § 1367(b) 
prohibits the addition of claims and parties which would destroy 
diversity supports our interpretation of § 1367(a) as also fully 
respecting the rules of diversity in cases invoking the original 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.278 
The problem with the foregoing analysis should be fairly obvious.  It 
violates the following well accepted canons of statutory interpretations: 
(i) “Provisos and statutory exceptions should be read narrowly”;279 and 
(ii) “Avoid interpreting a provision in a way that is inconsistent with the 
structure of the statute.”280  The minority distorts the “plain meaning” of 
 
Leonhardt’s exegesis of that phrase.  Essentially, he borrows the broad definition of “original 
jurisdiction” from the removal statutes to contend, just for federal question cases, that § 1367(a)’s 
“original jurisdiction” refers to not only a federal anchor claim but to all pendent claims that would 
have been permitted under pre-§1367 caselaw.  The problem with this proposed solution, however, 
is that it renders the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute “superfluous” in the Gibbs context and 
would, in effect, reinstate the spurned Finley holding that everyone concedes the statute sought to 
change.  Professor Pfander admits as much.  Id. at 1222.  Thus, rejecting the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits’ interpretation of “original jurisdiction,” which Professor Pfander concedes is “crisp and 
logically consistent,” one would be left with an alternative definition that Professor Pfander calls 
“messy and somewhat inconsistent.”  Id. at 1220-23.  This tends to be the way analyses go that are 
result-oriented instead of faithful to a statute’s text.  In this case, the alternative interpretation of 
“original jurisdiction” that has its goal the maintenance of pre-§1367 caselaw necessarily carried 
Finley’s baggage with it. 
 277. Section 1367(b) reads, in full, as follows: 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded 
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made 
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over 
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, 
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (emphasis added). 
 278. Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640.  See also Trimble, 232 F.3d at 962 (quoting Leonhardt  
favorably). 
 279. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 247, at 376. 
 280. Id. 
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§ 1367(b) by ignoring the fact that the cherry-picked language acts as a 
limitation on the exception to supplemental jurisdiction in subpart (b) 
and not as a limitation on the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction 
offered in subpart (a).  In other words, “the last phrase of subsection (b) 
means that there is supplemental jurisdiction over a claim otherwise 
excepted from supplemental jurisdiction by subsection (b) if § 1332, as 
understood before the passage of § 1367, would have authorized 
jurisdiction over that claim.”281  For example, if caselaw interpreting § 
1332 recognized supplemental jurisdiction in some context not 
recognized by the express exceptions in subpart (b), this proviso would 
mercifully limit the application to subpart (a)’s grant and allow a federal 
court to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.282  This reading 
not only recognizes the obvious structure of § 1367, it also “preserves a 
small slice of supplemental jurisdiction that would have otherwise have 
been lost”283 by the enactment of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute. 
In sum, the “plain meaning” result achieved by the ever-widening 
majority of circuit courts to address § 1367 faithfully honors the text of 
the statute in a manner consistent with well accepted canons of statutory 
construction.  If the decisions of the Tenth, Eight and Third Circuits 
were to prevail, it would effectively read Rules 20 and 23 into subpart 
(b) where they do not currently join the list of other exceptions.  This 
would make the list of exceptions in subpart (b) meaningless.284  In 
essence, it would be irrelevant to one’s analysis whether or not a 
scenario was listed in subpart (b) because a litigant would always have 
to resort to pre-§1367 caselaw in order to determine if a federal court 
could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any proposed claim in a 
diversity lawsuit.  While some critics of § 1367 clearly would prefer to 
treat the statute as a mere guiding light285 for courts to use as a reference 
in the continuing judicial evolution of the doctrine of supplemental 
jurisdiction, this view of the statute is not consistent with the 
 
 281. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938. 
 282. An example of this would be in situations where a plaintiff asserts a defensive claim in 
response to a claim raised against it by a third-party defendant.  See infra Section V.2. 
 283. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938. 
 284. Of course, as noted previously, any interpretation that would render other provisions of a 
statute superfluous or unnecessary should be avoided.  See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 285. See, e.g., Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 6, at 986 (“[E]ven if section 1367 had 
delegated the task to the judges as the drafters belatedly wish it had . . . .”); Rowe, supra note 2, at 
56 (“Experience with the codification effort when it took place in 1990 had left me, even before the 
controversy about the statute mounted in the following year, with doubts about whether the area was 
better treated by legislation or by decisional law.”); Pfander, supra note 2, at 115 (advocating a form 
of interpretation that considers the legislative purposes and history and admitting that such a canon 
would “restore the courts’ role in the further elaboration of supplemental jurisdictional law”). 
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Constitution’s delicate balancing of power.286  Further, the majority’s 
straightforward interpretation avoids the problem inherent in the 
opposition’s analysis of overruling Gibbs and reviving Finley in the 
name of preserving Zahn—an ugly duckling precedent without historical 
support.287  Another advantage of interpreting § 1367 according to its 
plain meaning is that this approach necessarily provides a “background 
of clear interpretive rules”288 against which Congress may freely make 
alterations with subsequent revisions to the rules, confident of the 
expected results any such revision. 
If fidelity to the text of § 1367 requires that Zahn and Clark be 
overruled, two questions logically remain.  First, is such a result 
“absurd”?289  If so, courts are well within their recognized duty to go 
beyond the statute’s text to avoid such an outcome.  Second, what are 
the implications for such a plain meaning of § 1367 in other disputed 
contexts? 
The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held, 
collectively, that a plain reading of § 1367, which overrules Zahn and 
Clark, is not absurd.  However, none of those cases go into much detail 
about what the “absurd” standard actually entails and there is a dearth of 
authoritative discussion of the issue.290  Other phrases courts have used 
for this standard include: “gross absurdity”;291 “absurd, and perhaps 
unconstitutional”;292 “clearly . . . inconsistent with the purposes and 
policies of the act in question”;293 and precluding “rational 
application.”294  While these varying articulations of a standard suggest 
an imprecise benchmark, they all suggest that an absurd result is not 
 
 286. Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 6, at 989 (“[D]efining their own jurisdiction by 
ignoring contrary statutory provisions in the guide of interpretation is an inappropriate role for the 
federal courts.  Even at Congress’ behest, it is inappropriate.  For under article III that job belongs to 
Congress.”). 
 287. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
 288. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.  Whether or not one agrees with the result achieved by Justice 
Scalia’s rigid textualist approach in Finley, there is certainly nothing wrong with striving toward a 
clear interpretation of a statute to assist Congress in understanding the impact of its legislative 
actions. 
 289. Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 529; W. Va Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 
(1991); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (rejecting lower court’s 
“plain language reading” of statue where it would lead to a “positively absurd” result). 
 290. See, e.g., Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 529; Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931-32; Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 
118-19; Gibson,  261 F.3d at 940. 
 291. Ink v. Commr., 912 F.2d 325 (9th  Cir. 1990). 
 292. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 293. See, e.g., United States v. Kennings, 861 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 294. See, e.g., Pacific v. Krump Constr., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 1324, 1341 (D. Nev. 1996). 
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merely one with which a particular court might personally disagree.  As 
one scholar has reminded: “[T]he absurd results doctrine should be used 
sparingly because it entails the risk that the judiciary will displace 
legislative policy on the basis of speculation that the legislature could 
not have meant what it unmistakably said.”295  At least with regard to 
Zahn it is pretty tough, even for that decision’s most ardent 
supporters,296 to argue with much conviction that its demise is absurd, 
and no court has so held. 
For the Fifth Circuit, the literal interpretation of § 1367 was not 
absurd because certain justices on the Supreme Court were not 
supportive of Zahn anyway,297 certain “respected commentators” 
favored the demise of Zahn,298 and because overruling Zahn would help 
to “harmonize case law and ‘enable federal courts to resolve complex 
interstate disputes in mass tort situations.’”299  Indeed, one might argue 
with greater conviction that what was absurd was the lack of rationality 
that had been tolerated in the caselaw prior to the enactment of § 
1367.300  The court reminded though that “the wisdom of the statute is 
not [its] affair beyond determining that overturning Zahn is not 
absurd.”301 
But what of the legislative history, which the courts in Leonhardt, 
Mercury and Trimble thought was so convincingly in favor of 
maintaining Zahn and Clark?  One district judge believed that honoring 
the text of the statute rather than its arguably contrary legislative history 
amounted to gamesmanship: “We know what you meant to say, but you 
didn’t quite say it.  So the message from us in the judicial branch to you 
in the legislative branch is: ‘Gotcha!  And better luck next time.’”302  
With all due deference to that colorful court, the legislative history of § 
1367 is not all that its admirers make it out to be.  In all of the pages of 
hearings, committee reports and even the Report of the Federal Rules 
Study Committee, there is actually very little mention of Zahn or Clark.  
The linchpin upon which the holdings of Leonhardt, Mercury and 
Trimble are bound is a fairly obscure reference in the footnote of the 
House Committee Report.  That Report states that § 1367 “is not 
 
 295. SINGER, supra note 246, at 90-91. 
 296. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 14, at 1209. 
 297. The court noted that Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall had dissented in Zahn.  
Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 529. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. (quoting Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 6, at 1008). 
 300. See supra Section IV.A.1 (discussing Ben-Hur and Zahn). 
 301. Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 529. 
 302. Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 819-20 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
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intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in 
diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior 
to Finley.”303  The Report then drops a footnote citing to both Ben-Hur 
and Finley.304  One major problem with reliance on this footnote in the 
report is that there is no plausible reading of the actual text of § 1367 
that would permit the vitality of both of those inconsistent decisions.305 
Further, to suggest that the legislative history is consistent would be 
an overstatement. The Working Papers of a subcommittee of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, which generally advocated codification of the 
supplemental jurisdiction caselaw as it existed prior to Finley, 
specifically noted that its proposed legislation would overrule Zahn: 
The exception is that our proposal would overrule the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), 
which held that each plaintiff in a diversity action must meet the 
amount in controversy requirement.  Although Zahn did not discuss 
pendent jurisdiction, the lower courts have correctly understood it to 
preclude the joinder of claims for less than the requisite amount in 
controversy to a claim that satisfies the requirement.  From a policy 
standpoint, this decision makes little sense, and we therefore 
recommend that Congress overrule it.306 
Perhaps it is just these types of inconsistencies among the many 
footnotes comprising the legislative history of a major piece of 
legislation that argues against being too quick to abandon statutory 
text.307  In any event, after reviewing all of this inconsistent legislative 
history, the Ninth Circuit thoughtfully concluded that it did not rise to a 
level sufficient to permit the court to ignore the plain text of the statute: 
We do not believe that this is enough to overcome the plain meaning of 
 
 303. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 88, at 29. 
 304. Id. at 29 n.17. 
 305. “Adding Rule 23 [through creative interpretation] to § 1367(b)’s exceptions would have 
the effect of reversing the result in Ben-Hur even as it sustains the result in Zahn.  Indeed, the House 
Report’s admonition that both Zahn and Ben-Hur survive the enactment of § 1367 is simply 
impossible to square with the plain text of the statute.”  Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 117 n.4; See 16 JAMES 
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 106.44, at 106-63 (Daniel Coquillette et al. 
eds., 3d ed., Matthew Bender 2003) (“[A]ssuming that Congress did in fact intend to codify both 
Ben-Hur and Zahn, there exists no rational construction of the text of the statute that could dictate 
that result.”). 
 306. SUBCOMM. REPORTS, supra note 55, at 561 n.33 (emphasis added; internal citations 
omitted). 
 307. See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 247, chs. 6, 8 (discussing in some detail the 
debate about whether, and to what extent legislative history should be used to help decipher 
legislative intent).  “Perhaps the relevance of the legislative history is not best tied to specific 
legislative intent, but instead to general intent or purpose.”  Id. at 300-01. 
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the text.  Legislative history can justify a judicial departure from a 
clear text if Congress makes an obvious clerical error, particularly if 
the error results in an absurd or difficult-to-justify result. . . . But that is 
not the case here.  Even courts that have read § 1367 to preserve Zahn 
agree that the result of such a reading would not be absurd.  See, e.g., 
Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 819 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997) (“Overruling Zahn would not be absurd; arguably, it would 
be sensible.”).  Moreover, as shown in our discussion of the Working 
Paper[s] of the Federal Courts Study Committee, some of those 
involved in drafting § 1367 both knew that the language chosen for § 
1367 would over-rule Zahn and approved of that result on policy 
grounds. 
The legislative history therefore does not persuade us that we should 
refuse to follow what we believe is the clear meaning of the text of § 
1367. . . . . If courts could ignore the plain meaning of statutory texts 
because their legislative histories showed that some (or even many) of 
those who drafted and voted for the texts did not understand what they 
were doing, the plain meaning of many statutes, not only § 1367, 
would be in jeopardy.308 
Perhaps if the central purpose of § 1367 had been to preserve Zahn, 
one might be able to argue in favor of a departure from its text.  Indeed, 
if Leonhardt’s tortured statutory analysis were to prevail, one would 
have a strong case for resorting to legislative history to overcome a 
holding that Finley survives.309  However, it is beyond doubt that neither 
Zahn nor its cousin Clark were at the forefront of many congressional 
minds when § 1367 was enacted.310 
From the perspective of public policy, it is even more difficult to 
argue with the overruling of Zahn and Clark.311  Congress has shown 
increasing willingness to soften the diversity requirements in order to 
enable complex, multi-party cases to have easier access to a federal 
forum.312  An example of this is the January 2003 enactment of the 
 
 308. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 940-41. 
 309. See supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text. 
 310. Indeed, it would be fair to say that the scholarly drafters forgot about Zahn and Clark in 
the midst of their efforts to, for the most part, codify the prior caselaw. 
 311. Professor Rowe agrees that the impact of overruling Zahn and Clark is mostly 
incremental: “Avoiding truck-sized holes in the complete diversity requirement by maintaining the 
Kroger principle is one thing; excluding below-limit claims related to those already before a federal 
court in a diversity case—which the law at least before 1367 generally had done—is another.”  
Rowe, supra note 2, at 62. 
 312. One author noted that these types of policy considerations underlying § 1367 that support 
even a non-textual based rationale for the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, overruling 
Zahn and Clark.  See Mark C. Cawley, Note, The Right Result for the Wrong Reasons: Permitting 
53
Underwood: Congress' Accidental Improvement of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
UNDERWOOD2.DOC 5/14/2004  10:30 AM 
706 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:653 
Multiparty, Multiform Jurisdiction statute.313  This statute generally 
provides for minimal diversity federal jurisdiction in cases of mass-
disasters where at least seventy-five persons are killed (e.g., airplane 
crashes).  Further, as of the time of this writing Congress appears close 
to enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, which, among other 
things, would permit federal diversity jurisdiction for interstate class 
actions meeting a certain aggregate level amount in controversy with 
only minimal diversity among the named parties.314  This latter statute, if 
finally enacted, would essentially destroy the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Snyder v. Harris315 (precluding the aggregation of damages in class 
action to meet the amount in controversy) for at least a large portion of 
class actions.  Thus, the momentum of Congress is, increasingly, in 
favor of allowing more multi-party and class actions into federal court 
up to the limits of the Court’s Article III diversity jurisdiction.316  
Professor Fink summed up some of the possible public policy arguments 
in favor of the elimination of Zahn and Clark as follows: 
Questions of interpretive approach (whether the legislative history can 
cure the gap in the statutory text) aside, the Zahn requirement can have 
the unfortunate effects of either making a federal class action 
impossible despite the presence of an adequate and diverse 
representative with a claim that comes within federal jurisdiction, or 
splitting a class action between federal and state courts depending on 
which plaintiffs have claims that do and do not exceed $75,000.  If the 
courts do not end up interpreting § 1367 as overruling Zahn, should 
Congress amend the statute to get rid of the Zahn rule, as a way of 
making the federal forum more available for aggregative litigation with 
a mixture of larger and smaller claims?  And while Congress is at it, 
would there be any good reason not to eliminate the restrictive 
aggregation rule for non-class multi-plaintiff cases (which the Supreme 
 
Aggregation of Claims Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in Multi-Party Diversity Litigation, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1045, 1075-76 (1998) (“[Congressional] intent to further judicial economy is simply 
inconsistent with the Judiciary Committee’s purported desire to preserve Zahn.”). In light of the 
House Committee’s report, however, it is a stretch to argue anything beyond the fact that a review 
of the legislative history does not lead to entirely clear conclusions. 
 313. 28 U.S.C. § 1369. 
 314. See Neil, supra note 28, at 48; SEN. RPT. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. RPT. 108-1115. 
 315. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
 316. Further, as the Seventh Circuit rationalized in Stromberg: 
[I]t is hard to avoid remarking that allowing thousands of small claims into federal court 
via the class device is a substantially greater expansion of jurisdiction than is allowing a 
single pendent party.  It is therefore easy to imagine wanting to overturn Clark but not 
Zahn; it is much harder to imagine wanting to overturn Zahn but not Clark, and we have 
no reason to believe that Congress harbored such a secret desire. 
Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931. 
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Court viewed as supporting its holding in Zahn) . . . by authorizing 
supplemental jurisdiction over below-limit claims?317 
As the Fifth Circuit recognized, however, so long as the statute’s effects 
do not lead to “absurd” results, the statute’s resolutions of issues of 
public policy are for the legislature and not the courts.318  There is 
certainly no public policy concern raised by the statute’s effects on Zahn 
and Clark319 sufficient to warrant departure from application of the 
statute’s plain meaning. 
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF A PLAIN-MEANING INTERPRETATION OF § 1367 
As we have seen, the literal interpretation of § 1367 necessarily 
causes the overruling of Zahn and Clark, which hardly ushers in the 
demise of the federal court system.  Despite the decisions reaching this 
result in the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, there 
have been no reports of mass filings in the districts encompassed by 
those courts of appeal nor has “the Republic . . . tottered.”320  Indeed, it 
has been thirteen years since the enactment of § 1367 and the federal 
courts have not yet been forced to close their doors.  In fact, one of 
Professor Rowe’s key proposed revisions to § 1367 is to amend its text 
to provide expressly for the same results reached by those courts—a 
result already dictated by the text of the current statute.  But what are the 
ramifications of the textual-oriented decisions of the courts in Abbott 
Labs, Stromberg, Gibson, Rosmer and Allapattah for other issues 
surrounding the interpretation and analysis of the interplay between § 
1367(a)-(b)?  In this last section, I will briefly discuss two other 
important issues that have arisen concerning the reach of these two 
provisions and how the plain-meaning analysis, to the extent the current 
majority rule ultimately prevails, may impact their resolution. 
A. The End of Strawbridge v. Curtis’ Complete Diversity? 
A profound fear arising after the enactment of § 1367 was that its 
literal interpretation would lead to the undoing of Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss’ complete diversity requirement—the most treasured of the 
judicial tools used to limit the federal courts’ resolution of purely state 
 
 317. FINK ET AL., supra note 142, at 444. 
 318. Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d at 524. 
 319. The Rule 20 incongruity, while perplexing, does not render the effects of § 1367 on Clark 
“absurd.” 
 320. Rowe, supra note 2, at 64. Professor Rowe advocates that § 1367 be revised to make it 
even more explicit that Zahn and Clark are overruled.  Id. at 62-64. 
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law disputes.321  Even in the midst of utilizing its plain meaning analysis 
of § 1367 in the Rule 20 context, the Seventh Circuit fretted over the 
implications of its literal analysis: 
The complete-diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss excludes from 
federal court [diversity] cases in which citizens of the same state are on 
each side.  Supplemental jurisdiction has the potential to move from 
complete to minimal diversity.322 
The thinking has been that, if the literal application of § 1367(a)-(b) 
means that a plaintiff with a claim for less than $75,000 can join her 
claim to another plaintiff’s claim that satisfies § 1332’s amount-in-
controversy requirement—as was the holding of the Seventh Circuit in 
Stromberg—then what is there in the text of § 1367 to preclude a 
plaintiff with the same state citizenship as a defendant from joining her 
claim with the related claim of a diverse plaintiff? Or stated another 
way, since the complete diversity requirement shares its origins in § 
1332 with the amount-in-controversy requirement, doesn’t the abolition 
of Clark signal the abolition of Strawbridge as well?  Other notable 
scholars have echoed concern over this possible plain meaning 
interpretation.  In Professor Fink’s casebook on federal courts, he 
observes: 
Read literally, § 1367’s broad authorization of supplemental 
jurisdiction, coupled with the failure of § 1367(b) to exclude claims by 
parties joined under Rule 20 (as opposed to plaintiffs’ claims against 
parties joined under Rule 20, which are excluded), would confer 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim of a California co-
plaintiff in an Arizona plaintiff’s diversity suit against a California 
defendant.  That would create a gaping hole in the Strawbridge 
complete diversity rule, contrary to Congress’s intent not to authorize 
supplemental jurisdiction  “when doing so would be inconsistent with 
the jurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute”.  At this writing 
no reported decision has interpreted § 1367 to have this effect of 
partially overruling Strawbridge.  But cf. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. 
v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). . . .”323 
Among the federal district courts, these precise fears of § 1367 
overruling Strawbridge have not yet been realized,324 at least in the 
context of claims joined in an original complaint.  A plain meaning 
 
 321. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806). 
 322. Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932 (internal citations omitted). 
 323. FINK ET AL., supra note 142, at 442 (quoting the HOUSE COMM. REPORT). 
 324. See infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
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application of § 1367 does not necessarily do away with the complete 
diversity requirement of § 1332.  For supplemental jurisdiction to apply, 
§ 1367(a) requires there to be a claim over which the federal court has 
“original jurisdiction.”  The complete diversity rule, by its very 
definition, does not tolerate a blinders-on analysis of only one plaintiff’s 
citizenship in isolation from that of the remaining co-plaintiffs.  Unlike § 
1332’s amount-in-controversy requirement, which courts have 
historically understood to require satisfaction by each claimant 
independent of other claimants in the action,325 complete diversity 
requires a court to compare the citizenships of all plaintiffs from that of 
all defendants in the action.326  This difference has nothing to do with the 
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction or the text of § 1367(b) but, rather, 
is simply the way § 1332 has been interpreted since Strawbridge.  Thus, 
because no plaintiff can be considered completely diverse unless all 
plaintiffs share that diversity, this component of § 1332’s requirements 
has been and should continue to be treated different from the amount-in-
controversy requirement.  As a result, Strawbridge is absolutely 
distinguishable from Clark and is not overruled by the plain meaning of 
§ 1367.  The few reported federal district court cases to hear this issue 
concur.327  Those courts have distinguished the holding in Stromberg 
(and Abbott Labs) on the grounds that the complete diversity 
requirement is qualitatively different from the amount-in-controversy 
requirement.328 
However, the thornier issue is whether this analysis is altered in any 
meaningful way by the timing of the Rule 20 joinder.  In other words, 
may a non-diverse co-plaintiff join a lawsuit after the filing of an 
original complaint by a diverse plaintiff—and the attachment of 
“original jurisdiction”—under § 1367(a)?  The scholarly drafters of § 
1367 recognized this potential problem in the early days of the statute’s 
life: 
 
 325. See, e.g., Snyder, 394 U.S. at 332; Clark, 306 U.S. at 583. 
 326. See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990) (all plaintiffs must be 
diverse from all defendants in order to satisfy diversity under § 1332(a)); Kroger, 437 U.S. at 365 
(same). 
 327. See, e.g., Growth Fund v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 1998 WL 375201 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(refusing to find supplemental jurisdiction in case with aliens as plaintiffs and defendants even 
though plaintiffs also included citizens of the U.S.); In re Gas Water Heater Prod. Liab. Litig., 1996 
WL 732525, at *5 (E.D. La. 1996) (“Abbott did not change the law with respect to diversity of 
citizenship. . . . Without first acquiring original jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs, the court 
cannot consider its supplemental jurisdiction.”). 
 328. See, e.g., Growth Fund, 1998 WL 375201 at *3 (“[I]t is thus a stretch to apply these 
holdings [Stromberg and Abbott Labs] to this case, where the complete diversity requirement, rather 
than the amount in controversy, is the central issue.”). 
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Literally, though, section 1367(b) does not bar an original complete 
diversity filing and subsequent amendment to add a nondiverse co-
plaintiff under Rule 20, taking advantage of supplemental jurisdiction 
over the claim of the new plaintiff against the existing defendant.  We 
can only hope that the federal courts will plug that potentially gaping 
hole in the complete diversity requirement . . . .329 
Unfortunately for these drafters of § 1367, the only two published 
decisions on this precise issue have failed to “plug that potentially 
gaping hole” and have held instead that supplemental jurisdiction was 
properly exercised over the subsequently joined claims of nondiverse 
plaintiffs.330  Those two decisions offer very little analysis other than the 
fact that § 1367(b) does not list the joinder of claims by plaintiffs under 
Rule 20 among its exceptions.331  In one of the decisions the court at 
least addressed the argument that amount-in-controversy and complete 
diversity were distinguishable, but the court found that argument 
unpersuasive: 
Admittedly, both of these cases [Stromberg and Abbott Labs] dealt 
with the joinder of plaintiffs who by themselves did not meet the 
amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332, whereas here the 
additional Plaintiffs do not satisfy the requirement of complete 
diversity.  However, the language of § 1367 does not distinguish 
between these two requirements, and the courts drew no such 
distinction.332 
Accordingly, it is conceivable to conclude just from the holdings of 
the foregoing district courts that whether or not Strawbridge still 
requires each plaintiff to be diverse from the defendants depends upon 
whether the non-diverse plaintiff is included in the original complaint or 
added by subsequent amendment.  In the former situation there is never 
any original jurisdiction under § 1367(a), while in the latter situation 
there was clearly original jurisdiction when the lawsuit was first filed.  If 
one were to conclude that such a timing-based reading of § 1367(a) were 
required by its plain language, this would effectively overrule 
Strawbridge’s complete diversity requirement.  Nevertheless, this 
limited, theoretical overruling of Strawbridge is not the catastrophe that 
it might appear to be at first blush. 
 
 329. Rowe, Reply, supra note 93, at 961 n.91. 
 330. See, e.g., Sunpoint Sec., Inc. v. Porta, 192 F.R.D. 716 (M.D. Fla. 2000); El Chico Rest., 
Inc. v. Aetna, 980 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Ga. 1997). 
 331. Sunpoint, 192 F.R.D. at 719; El Chico, 980 F. Supp. at 1484. 
 332. El Chico, 980 F. Supp. at 1484 n.9 (emphasis added). 
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A possible answer to this “gaping hole” riddle lies in the unique 
nature of the complete diversity requirement.  As already mentioned, § 
1332’s complete diversity requirement is exceptional in that it does not 
permit the piecemeal consideration of one claimant’s citizenship to the 
exclusion of the others.333  In cases “arising under” federal law, by 
contrast, the Supreme Court has understood that not every aspect of the 
case must involve that federal question for § 1331 to be satisfied.334  
Similarly, with regard to § 1332’s amount-in-controversy requirement, 
the Supreme Court has held that a piecemeal analysis of each claimant’s 
damages was essential.335  Section 1367(a)’s structure seems to 
contemplate such piecemeal analysis and this poses no enormous 
difficulty in either of those two scenarios.  The real difficulty lies at the 
intersection of § 1367 and § 1332’s complete diversity requirement, for 
the former generally requires the court to engage in the piecemeal search 
for a federal anchor claim while the latter compels a unified analysis of 
the entire case.  Because § 1367(a) does not alter the requirements for 
original jurisdiction, and because the complete diversity requirement of 
§ 1332 mandates the inclusion in the equation of all plaintiffs’ 
citizenships, the subsequent joinder of a nondiverse plaintiff to a 
diversity lawsuit means that the federal “anchor” is lost at precisely the 
same metaphysical moment that supplemental jurisdiction would attach. 
This situation of adding a non-diverse plaintiff parallels cases 
involving a federal question claim coupled with a state-law claim where 
the federal claim goes away prior to trial.  In fact, the most analogous 
circumstance would be where the plaintiff chooses to amend her 
complaint prior to trial to delete the only federal cause of action in favor 
of the substitution of a state-law claim.  In that instance, the well 
recognized rule has been that federal courts must exercise their 
discretion to dismiss the state-law claim, at least when the federal claim 
disappears well before trial, because the federal component that 
originally gave rise to the court’s jurisdiction has become 
extinguished.336  This is equivalent because it involves a situation where 
the federal court has original jurisdiction over the case at the outset but 
subsequent events remove the component that justified federal 
jurisdiction.  In such instances, § 1367(c) preserves Gibbs’ requirement 
 
 333. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806). 
 334. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
 335. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). 
 336. See, e.g., Parker & Parsley Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing 
district court’s entry of near $200 million judgment following a trial on state-law claims when 
federal RICO cause of action was dismissed a few months before trial). 
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that courts utilize their discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction.337  As a practical matter, therefore, if a plaintiff adds a 
nondiverse plaintiff to a diversity lawsuit early in the litigation, the 
federal district court would essentially be required to dismiss the case 
under § 1367(c).  On the other hand, if the case is far enough along that a 
trial court would traditionally have been permitted to go forward with a 
trial even after the federal anchor has been lost, case law under Rule 
15(a) would generally not permit the joinder as untimely.338 
Of course, it would be plausible for a court to conclude that a true 
ambiguity is found at the complete diversity intersection of §§ 1332 and 
1367(a).339  If such a conclusion were to be reached, of course, the 
legislative history would make it abundantly clear that Congress never 
intended to dispense with the Strawbridge rule for plaintiffs joined under 
Rule 20.  After all, there is no indication in § 1367’s legislative history 
that its drafters, or anyone in Congress, ever contemplated the legislative 
overruling of Strawbridge. Thus, this legislative history would lead 
courts to hold that a nondiverse plaintiff cannot be joined to a 
preexisting federal diversity lawsuit.340 
Whether one concludes that the joinder of nondiverse plaintiffs can 
be permitted subject to the near-required dismissal under § 1367(c), or 
that § 1367(a) is ambiguous in this context, there is no reason why § 
1367’s practical effect will be to open the floodgates to minimally 
diverse state-law lawsuits.  One thing is certain—in the thirteen years 
since § 1367’s enactment, the worst-case scenarios posed by the statute’s 
critics have yet to be realized. 
2. Claims by Plaintiffs in Defensive Posture 
Another interesting area of debate, but which has received much 
less attention than those issues discussed above, concerns a diversity 
 
 337. See, e.g., Brazinski v. Amoco Petrol. Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 338. While Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) permits the liberal grant of amendments to pleadings, courts 
routinely deny leave to amend when the motion comes late in the case. 
 339. See Heather McDaniel, Plugging the “Gaping Hole”: The Effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 49 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1069 (1997) (arguing that an ambiguity exists in this context not in § 1367(a) but 
in subpart (b)’s last sentence). 
 340. Further, this result would also be consistent with Kroger, in which the Supreme Court 
refused to create any incentives for a diversity plaintiff to refrain from naming a defendant to 
manufacture diversity.  If the complete diversity requirement could be avoided just by waiting to 
name the absent non-diverse plaintiff until the week after defendant answers, the complete diversity 
rule would be easily circumvented.  In addition, the fact that Congress recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 
1369 (providing for federal jurisdiction in mass tort situations with only minimal diversity) 
demonstrates that Congress does not view § 1367 as dispensing with complete diversity. 
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plaintiff’s assertion of claims in a defensive posture.  This arises in at 
least two relevant contexts: (i) a plaintiff’s compulsory counterclaim 
against a third-party defendant’s assertion of a cause of action against 
the plaintiff; and (ii) a plaintiff’s Rule 14 impleader of a third-party (e.g., 
for contribution and indemnity) in response to a defendant’s 
counterclaim.  The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in both of these 
situations would, at first blush, appear to be prohibited—in the absence 
of an independent jurisdictional basis—by the express terms of § 
1367(b).  Among the other claims for which supplemental jurisdiction is 
not permitted, subsection (b) carves out “claims by plaintiffs against 
persons made parties under Rule 14.”341  Indeed, two different district 
courts have held that the plain meaning of § 1367(b) precludes the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these types of claims.342 
What is unique about this interpretation is the fact that it changes 
the result from pre-§1367 caselaw in a jurisdiction-limiting fashion 
despite the fact that no courts or commentators had been advocating 
against that caselaw.  Although Kroger precluded a plaintiff’s offensive 
assertion of a claim against a third-party defendant joined by a 
defendant,343 the lower federal courts had come to recognize an 
exception to Kroger where the plaintiff’s claim against a third-party 
defendant was defensive in nature.344  The courts recognized 
supplemental jurisdiction in these instances because it promoted 
efficiency and fairness and because Kroger’s concern with 
gamesmanship by plaintiffs refraining from joining non-diverse targets 
in their original complaint was not implicated in these defensive 
situations.345  Because of this prior caselaw, one district court 
commented that, were it not for the court’s allegiance to the plain 
 
 341. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 
 342. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Aldridge, 906 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s impleader of a non-diverse third-party defendant for contribution on defendant’s 
counterclaim with the following textual analysis: “Because the plaintiff . . . brought in [third-party 
defendant] under Rule 14, the plain language of § 1367(b) appears to prohibit the Court from 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] third-party action against them.”); Guaranteed 
Sys., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (same). 
 343. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 344. See, e.g., Finkle v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1984); Berel Co. v. 
Sencit F/G McKinley Assoc., 125 F.R.D. 100 (D.N.J. 1989); Hyman-Michaels Co. v. Swiss Bank 
Corp., 496 F. Supp. 663, 666 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Kroger specifically 
noted the distinction between an offensive and defensive claim against parties impleaded under Rule 
14.  Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376 (the Court stating that the plaintiff’s offensive claim against the third-
party defendant in that case was “simply not ancillary to the federal one in the same sense that, for 
example, the impleader by a defendant of a third-party defendant always is”). 
 345. Id. 
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interpretation of the statute, it would have permitted such a defensive 
assertion of a claim against a Rule 14 party under the statute.346 
Commentators have used this apparent overruling of prior caselaw 
as another negative aspect of § 1367 to justify a call for its revision or 
repeal.  The statute’s drafter, Professor Rowe, stated regarding this issue: 
Limited case law under § 1367, however, has read the terms of the 
statute as banning such claims by plaintiffs even though the claims are 
brought defensively.  Whatever the interpretive pros and cons of these 
decisions, the results seem unfortunate and worth overruling in a 
revised 1367.  One way or another . . . supplemental jurisdiction 
should be defined to include claims asserted by plaintiffs in a defensive 
posture in response to claims against them.347 
This outcry against § 1367(b)’s application to such defensive 
claims against Rule 14 parties is unnecessary, however, because the 
plain meaning of subsection (b) does not preclude the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.  The interpretation of a 
statute’s text should, obviously, include consideration of each of its 
terms.  In this instance, the lower courts have misunderstood or 
overlooked completely the last proviso of § 1367(b)—“when exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with 
the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”  The way § 1367 is 
structured, this proviso acts only to limit the reach of § 1367(b)’s 
exception to § 1367(a)’s broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction.348  As 
the Ninth Circuit put it: 
The text of § 1367 has the following analytical structure: first, 
subsection (a) broadly confers supplemental jurisdiction, subject to 
certain exceptions; second, the first part of subsection (b) sets out 
 
 346. Guaranteed Sys., 842 F. Supp. at 857. 
If it were not bound by the plain terms of the statute, the court would be swayed by the 
interests of justice and efficiency to construe Plaintiff’s claim as a claim by a defendant 
against a person made party under Rule 14 rather than a claim by a plaintiff, and thus to 
allow it to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).  The court believes, however, that such a 
construction would reach beyond the limits of Section 1367(b). 
Id. 
 347. Rowe, supra note 2, at 67.  See also Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 6, at 983-85 
(commenting on this unforeseen consequence of § 1367’s enactment, and calling on “Congress to 
clean up the section 1367 mess by replacing it with a properly thought-out supplemental jurisdiction 
statute on which all interested parties are afforded a fair opportunity to comment”). 
 348. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 1226.  “The Gibson court observes, quite correctly in my 
judgment, that the exception for circumstances that do not threaten the complete diversity 
requirement has the effect of bringing nonthreatening claims by the plaintiff back within the scope 
of supplemental jurisdiction that § 1367(b) might otherwise place beyond federal diversity 
jurisdiction.”  Id. 
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exceptions to subsection (a); and third, the last phrase of subsection (b) 
limits the reach of those exceptions.  We believe that the last phrase of 
subsection (b) means that there is supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim otherwise excepted from supplemental jurisdiction by subsection 
(b) if § 1332, as understood before the passage of § 1367, would have 
authorized jurisdiction over that claim.349 
Because this last proviso instructs courts, before dismissing a claim 
under one of § 1367(b)’s exceptions, to consider the pre-§1367 caselaw, 
the untoward apparent result decried by courts and commentators in this 
context is avoided.  Because Kroger was not interpreted to preclude a 
plaintiff’s defensive assertion of claims against a Rule 14 third-party 
defendant prior to § 1367,350 the statute does not compel a different 
result.  This analysis does not depart from the text of the statute.  To the 
contrary, it “gives specific meaning to the last phrase of § 1367(b), for it 
preserves a small slice of supplemental jurisdiction that would otherwise 
have been lost.”351  Of course, if one chooses to distort this last proviso 
into a limitation on subpart (a)’s jurisdictional grant—as Leonhardt and 
Professor Rowe have argued—this escape-valve interpretation would be 
unavailing.352 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute is the unwanted orphan of 
Title 28—perhaps even more disliked than the diversity statute.  The 
irony is that the academic community that clamored for its creation is 
now upset that it has usurped the role of the judiciary in evolving the 
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.  While some would advocate for a 
 
 349. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938. 
 350. See supra note 344. 
 351. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 938.  The Ninth Circuit, in Gibson, applied this analysis, in dicta, to 
the same circumstance: 
But without its last phrase, subsection (b) would also except from supplemental 
jurisdiction a claim asserted by the plaintiff against the third-party defendant when that 
claim is a compulsory counterclaim to a claim by the third-party defendant against the 
plaintiff.  The claim by the third-party defendant against the plaintiff is clearly within the 
supplemental jurisdiction conferred by subsection (a), and it would be both unfair and 
inefficient to forbid the plaintiff’s compulsory counterclaim to that claim. 
Id.  The Practice Commentary to § 1367 suggests an even broader loophole created by this last 
provision of subpart (b); that this language asks the courts to balance the traditional requirements of 
§ 1332 with practical considerations such as the extent to which the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction would “expedite the disposition of the case while the rejection of supplemental 
jurisdiction would not spare the federal court all that much.” DAVID D. SIEGEL, PRACTICE 
COMMENTARY, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, at 834 (West 1993). 
 352. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text. 
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canon of interpretation for this particular piece of legislation that would 
emasculate its authoritative dictates in favor of permitting courts to 
define jurisdiction as they see fit, this approach is both improper and 
unnecessary.  The statute is not necessarily perfect; yet it should not be 
forgotten that the courts had been unable to come up with a consistently 
coherent doctrine when left to their own devices for many decades.  
Because the pre-§ 1367 doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction 
were more the result of pragmatic balancing of competing desires than 
of premeditated logic, it was inevitable than any attempt at codification 
would be the catalyst for criticism.  Such has been the life of this statute.  
At least at the circuit court level, however, the majority of the courts are 
starting to show enough self-restraint to honor Congress’ constitutional 
right to define the jurisdiction of the inferior courts.  The good news is 
that deferring to the text of the statute, as presently written, does not 
undermine the business of the federal judiciary.353  In fact, at the end of 
the statutory rainbow lie a few significant, though unintended, 
advancements in the field. 
 
 353. See Lloyd C. Anderson, The American Law Institute Proposal to Bring Small-Claim 
State-Law Class Actions Within Federal Jurisdiction: An Affront to Federalism That Should Be 
Rejected, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 342 (2002) (“In the years since § 1367 was enacted, it has, 
for the most part, worked well.”). 
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